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Message from the Editors
In 2008, the Naval War College established the Center on
Irregular Warfare & Armed Groups (CIWAG). CIWAG’s primary
mission is twofold: first, to bring cutting-edge research on Irregular
Warfare into the Joint Professional Military Educational (JPME)
curricula; and second, to bring operators, practitioners, and scholars
together to share their knowledge and experiences about a vast array
of violent and non-violent irregular challenges. This case study is
part of an ongoing effort at CIWAG that includes symposia, lectures
by world-renowned academics, case studies, research papers,
articles, and books.
Professors Roger Petersen (MIT) and Jon Lindsay (University of
California, San Diego) are the authors of this case study, which uses
the insurgency in Iraq to help us understand the motivations that spur
individuals to join or reject a rebellion. This case study was created to
focus on two specific challenges that our experienced operators and
practitioners faced in Iraq: how to understand the actors and the
complex irregular warfare environment, and how to manage
interaction, adaptation, and reassessment in irregular warfare.
The authors provide four approaches to counterinsurgency used
in Iraq between 2003-2009 and ask what worked, when, and why. The
four approaches examined are: (1) “clear, hold, build” tactics
popularized in U.S. COIN doctrine; (2) decapitation, or leadership
targeting of insurgent organizations; (3) ethnic homogenization in the
course of civil war; and (4) mobilization of non-state armed
communities. The authors then use a spectrum of resistance, developed
by Roger Petersen, to examine the effect of these counterinsurgency
approaches in different regions and with different populations. Taken
together, this case study offers a useful analytical framework for
understanding how and why rebellions either grow or diminish.
This version of the case study was submitted in November 2011.
3
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It is important to note three critical caveats to this case study.
First, the opinions found in this case study are solely those of the author
and do not represent the views of the Department of Defense, the Naval
War College or CIWAG. Second, while every effort has been made to
correct any factual errors in this work, the author is ultimately
responsible for the content of this case study. Third, the study questions
presented in all CIWAG case studies are written to provoke discussion
on a wide variety of topics including strategic, operational, and tactical
matters as well as ethical and moral questions confronted by operators
in the battlefield. The point is to make these case studies part of an
evolving and adaptive curriculum that fulfills the needs of students
preparing to meet the challenges of the post-9/11 world and to show
them the dilemmas that real people faced in high-pressure situations.
Finally, in addition to a range of teaching questions that are
intended to serve as the foundation for classroom discussion, students
conducting research on Iraq will probably find the extensive
bibliography at the end of the case helpful. Compiled by the case study
authors and by CIWAG researchers at the Naval War College, the
bibliography is a selection of the best books and articles on a range of
related topics. We hope you find it useful, and look forward to hearing
your feedback on the cases and suggestions for how you can contribute
to the Center on Irregular Warfare & Armed Group’s mission here at
the Naval War College.
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Acronyms and Terms
AQI – al Qaeda in Iraq
CPA – Coalition Provisional Authority
CTC – Counterterrorist Center
EFP – Explosively-formed Penetrator
F3EA – Find, Fix, Finish, Exploit, Analyze
FM 3-24 – Field Manual 3-24: Counterinsurgency Field Manual
G-2 – intelligence officer
HUMINT – Human Intelligence
I MEF – First Marine Expeditionary Force
IFOR – Implementation Force
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IRA – Irish Republican Army
IRGC – Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps
ISF – Iraqi Security Forces
JAM – Mahdi Army
JOC – Joint Operations Center
MCIA – Marine Corps Intelligence Activity
MNF – Multinational Forces
NGA – National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency
NSA – National Security Agency
OIF – Operation Iraqi Freedom
OMS – Office of the Martyr Sadr
PSYOP – Psychological Operations
Sadr II – Ayatollah Sadiq al-Sadr, nephew of Iraqi Shia cleric Ayatollah
Muhammad Baqr al-Sadr
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WERV – Western Euphrates River Valley
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Case Summary
This case study focuses on insurgency and counter-insurgency in
Iraq and asks some of the most fundamental questions: why do men rebel,
and why does that rebellion become organized, and what works to counter
that rebellion?1
The authors examine three different regions in Iraq between 20032006 – Baghdad, the Sunni west and Anbar province, and the south. The
plunging levels of insurgent violence by the end of that period are most
often attributed to successful implementation of COIN or even “the
Surge”; however, the authors argue that the explanation is far more
complex. Indeed, they provide evidence that local and political
circumstances, specific to each region, played at least an equally important
role in driving down the level of social violence.
To make their case, the authors present a unique analytical
framework in Section II, a spectrum of participation in insurgency and
counterinsurgency. This spectrum illustrates the steps and roles that
individuals choose and move between in a rebellion. These can range at
one extreme to being an active member of a guerilla unit, to neutrality and,
at the other extreme, to joining government security forces.
The case study then examines six overlapping motivations that
spur individuals to join or reject a rebellion; six motivations that move
individuals along this spectrum of participation. The authors point out that
few individuals use simple cost-benefit rational calculations to decide the
level of their involvement in a rebellion. Instead, social ties, focal point
events, emotions, status, and complex psychological factors must be taken
into consideration in order how to understand why individuals join an
insurgency. The case also examines why some individuals stay neutral or
are never sufficiently animated by the spirit of rebellion to actively pick up
arms and fight.
1

Ted Robert Gurr, Why Men Rebel, Princeton University Press, 1970
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In Section III, within this context of why men rebel, the case then
examines four approaches to counterinsurgency used in Iraq between
2003-2009 by a variety of U.S. forces and asks what worked, when, and
why. The four approaches examined are: (1) “clear, hold, build” tactics
popularized in U.S. COIN doctrine; (2) decapitation, or leadership
targeting of insurgent organizations; (3) ethnic homogenization in the
course of civil war; and (4) mobilization of non-state armed communities.
In Section IV, the authors provide a close analysis of events in
Baghdad, Anbar province and the Sunni west, and the south. They
evaluate how to use data for evaluating progress in counterinsurgency
campaigns and whether cause and effect can be established. The authors
also ask what data better help us understand the effect of
counterinsurgency tactics, operations, and strategy. Last, they examine the
strategy of decapitation as an alternative explanation for the decrease in
violence that COIN has been credited with.
Finally, the authors point out that in counterinsurgency, there is no
substitute for deep social and cultural knowledge. Conducting these
assessments during the insurgency is incredibly difficult. This heightens
the importance of focusing on cultural and social knowledge as soon as
possible. Indeed, this may strengthen the argument for indirect action
approaches such as security force assistance and foreign internal defense
programs in order to build strong ties to communities and develop the
expertise necessary to understand the ties that bind a society together.
Key lessons from this analysis:

Few individuals use simple cost-benefit calculations to
decide the level of their involvement in a rebellion.

Social ties, focal point events, emotions, status, and
complex psychological factors must be taken into consideration in
order to understand why individuals join an insurgency.

The “spectrum of participation” can help to examine
whether a specific counterinsurgency approach works better in
10
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certain circumstances and which groups in society, a key to that
success.

Multiple factors beyond COIN tactics come together to
affect the level of support given to the government or the rebellion.
Identifying these factors and taking appropriate actions can help
sway a population toward government support.

In counterinsurgency, there is no substitute for deep social
and cultural knowledge, particularly amongst the individuals most
resistant to counterinsurgency strategies.

Developing cultural and social knowledge as soon as
possible is vital; preferably before a conflict arises. This raises the
question of how to balance direct versus indirect action and the
roles of general-purpose forces and special operations forces across
the irregular warfare spectrum.

11
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Discussion Questions
1. What are the key lessons of this case study for you? If you have
operational experience in Iraq during the time frame discussed,
does this case study help explain some of the dynamics of
rebellion that you witnessed?
2. Why do people rebel? Why do they obey?
3. What are the key stages of rebellion identified by Lindsay and
Petersen?
4. What triggers people to progress from one stage of the rebellion
to another?
5. Conversely, what motivates individuals to shift from supporting
the rebellion to neutrality or supporting the government?
6. How can the local population’s tipping point be identified
accurately and in a timely manner? Does the opposition have an
advantage in recognizing this? If so, what measures can you take
to overcome or compensate for this advantage? What is the role
of General Purpose Forces, Special Operational Forces, and
civilian subject matter experts in identifying the tipping point?
7. What might Coalition Forces have done differently to impede or
reverse the rebellion?
8. If you are on the ground, conducting or receiving these
assessments, how can you use this information? How can you set
aside entrenched biases (cultural, institutional, and personal) in
order to see alternative courses of action?
9. How can a conventional military force be flexible enough to
adapt to the changing tides of loyalty and rebellion inside an
insurgency? Should this flexibility come from the top-down or
the bottom-up?
10. How much time on the ground is needed to begin to understand
the local culture? Does “academic” or theoretical knowledge
12
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suffice, such as that provided in advance by subject matter
experts? Or is lived experience, in the local culture, necessary?
11. Are some cultures too “foreign” for Western militaries to
understand or relate to? What effect does that have on our troops
on the ground, and on higher-ups’ understanding of tactics,
motivations, and strategy? Can Security Force Assistance and
Foreign Internal Defense programs help to overcome these
barriers to understanding, or is something else needed?
12. How can you apply this case study to other situations?

13
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I. Introduction
A. “A Rather Negative Reaction”
Insurgency is extremely dangerous for its participants. Why would
individuals decide to take great personal risks to rebel against stronger
military opponents? Thamer Ibrahim Tahir al-Assafi, a member of the
Council of Muslim Scholars in Ramadi and a former commando who
served in the Iran-Iraq war, describes the emergence of insurgency in
Anbar Province in western Iraq:
After the fall of Baghdad … Coalition Forces … wanted to come
in from Baghdad, and they wanted to come in peacefully. An
agreement was struck between some of the tribal sheikhs and the
American forces for a peaceful entry. After they entered Ramadi,
there was a big demonstration, a peaceful demonstration, because
[the people] did not approve of an occupier coming into their
capital. The American forces did not respect the people who were
demonstrating. They dealt with them rather violently. The
people’s reaction was to pelt the Americans with rocks and
tomatoes, and it was a rather negative reaction. They provoked
the citizens. That was the first thing that started hatred.
The next day, they demonstrated again, and the
Americans treated them in the same manner, meaning their
armored vehicles went right through them. A young man, an 18year-old youth, threw a rock at an American tank, and the
soldiers shot him dead. We are a tribal people, and in our
tradition, we know revenge. If someone gets killed from your
family, you have to kill the killer, or at least a relative of his.
When the Iraqi army was dissolved, they left a lot of
armaments, including armored personnel carriers, heavy machine
14
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guns, and a lot ordnance. People took them and hid them in their
houses, not to have a future confrontation with the Americans,
but in fear of a confrontation with Iran. Keep in mind we are
military-trained people as a society because of the battles—the
Gulf War, the Iran War, the Kurds in the north. Most of us were
in the army, so using weapons was something we could do with
ease.
So these people whose youth was killed by the
Americans, they formed a cell, and they started looking for
revenge. They found out that placing an IED [improvised
explosive device] is a simple matter, so a lot of cells began
forming all over the place.
When the foreign Arabs came in, they came in with
suitcases full of dollars, and they started organizing cells. They
got in touch with the Iraqi people, and they started organizing
them better.2
Different people rebel for different reasons, and rebellion can take
on different forms, involving groups with different aims and backgrounds.
The revolt against Coalition Forces in this story grows from mass
demonstration, to violent protest, to the defense of family honor, to the
formation of local armed resistance, to the organization of potent terrorist
cells. What are the motivations of the participants at each stage? What
triggers them to progress from one to another? What might Coalition
Forces have done differently to impede or reverse this process?
Anbar was long one of the most violent regions in the Coalition’s
campaign in Iraq. By August 2006, violent attacks climbed to an average
of 50 per day, up 57% from February, and would continue to rise higher
still. Marine Corps Colonel Peter Devlin, intelligence officer (G-2) of the
2

Gary W. Montgomery and Timothy S. McWilliams, Al-Anbar Awakening: From
Insurgency to Counterinsurgency in Iraq, 2004-2009, Volume II, Iraqi Perspectives
(Quantico, VA: Marine Corps University Press, 2009), 33-34.
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1st Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF), released a somber assessment
that month: “The social and political situation has deteriorated to a point
that MNF [Multi National Forces] and ISF [Iraqi Security Forces] are no
longer capable of militarily defeating the insurgency in al-Anbar.”3
Yet by the following year, attacks in Anbar had plummeted to less
than five a day, and local tribesmen who had once fought against U.S.
troops now joined them in fighting the radical Islamist organization alQaeda in Iraq (AQI). Lieutenant General Ra’ad al-Hamdani, a former
commander of Saddam’s 2nd Republican Guard Corps, describes the
emergence of the “Awakening” in Anbar:
On the ground, it was discovered that these people [AQI] did not
work for the benefit of Iraq. Their objective was to destroy Iraq.
Accepting them turned into rejecting them, and for the lack of
real security forces, the people who started fighting them were
the people who suffered because of them. And that was done by
absorbing and using the tribal forces in the areas to fight and hold
the main target of the terrorists.
At the beginning of the Awakening, one of them was
Sattar Abu Risha. The success of Abdul Sattar Abu Risha broke
the fear barrier. The credit does not go only to Abdul Sattar Abu
Risha, but we appreciate him for firing the first shot.
There are tens and hundreds of thousands of Iraqis better
than Sattar Abu Risha who fought the terrorists and al-Qaeda, but
they have not come to the surface.
As you know, Sattar Abu Risha was not a nationalist, as
the Americans understand it. As you know, he was a road
gangster, and he committed crimes against Iraqi society
previously. For the benefit of the area, and the benefit of the
I MEF G-2, “State of the Insurgency in al-Anbar,” classified intelligence assessment on
17 August 2006, reprinted in Thomas E. Ricks, The Gamble: General David Petraeus
and the American Military Adventure in Iraq, 2006-2008 (New York: Penguin Press,
2009): 331-335
3
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Americans at that time, Sattar Abu Risha was raised above the
surface. There are thousands of Iraqi nationalists and patriots who
did the same thing he did.4
Like Han Solo in Star Wars, the charismatic Sattar Abu Risha rises
from criminal smuggler to popular hero. Just as people moved through
various degrees of support for rebellion in the opening vignette, here we
see varying degrees of resistance to rebellion. As there are different levels
of insurgency, what are the different degrees of counterinsurgency? How
much symmetry is there in people’s movement into insurgency and back
out into counterinsurgency?
The situation in Iraq overall followed Anbar’s after a lag of several
months. Measures of violent activity declined significantly throughout
2007 and early 2008, while during the same period, the “surge” of over
30,000 additional U.S. troops into Iraq brought the total to 171,000 by
October 2007. Under the leadership of a new commander in Iraq, General
David Petraeus, this larger force emphasized the protection of the
population in accordance with the newly drafted Army Field Manual 3-24,
Counterinsurgency (COIN).5
The correlation of Iraq’s plunging violence with rising force levels
and a new set of tactics offered a tempting recipe for success in irregular
warfare. Thus the Obama administration would reapply the new
conventional wisdom to Afghanistan by surging troops from the same
military with the same COIN manual under the same commander;
unfortunately, the outcome under very different local and political
circumstances was ambiguous at best. In truth, the reality in Iraq was
always more complicated than the simple surge narrative would suggest.
While the war is rich in irregular warfare lessons for military

4

Montgomery and McWilliams, Al-Anbar Awakening, Vol. II, 302
Michael O’Hanlon and Ian Livingston, “Iraq Index: Tracking Variables of
Reconstruction & Security in Post-Saddam Iraq,” Brookings Institution, 26 April 2011,
http://www.brookings.edu/iraqindex
5
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professionals, at least one of them must be the importance of humility
regarding the limits of doctrine amidst a shifting milieu of violent politics.

Discussion Questions
1. How important are standout figures like the youth who hurls rocks
at American armor or Sattar Abu Risha in fomenting change?
2. What, if anything, can or should friendly forces do to encourage
individuals to end their support of the rebellion?

B. Analytical Methodology
This exceedingly complex case covers many years of shifting
conflict across multiple diverse regions involving many different types of
actors. There is a vast amount of information and analysis about this
war—from journalist reportage, bureaucratic documentation and
government statements, academic and policy research, practitioner
memoirs and debriefings, and dramatic blogging and combat footage from
soldiers themselves—and yet a great deal still remains unknown or
unanalyzed, especially about Iraqi perspectives. The number of relevant
points at the strategic and operational levels that could be fruitfully
covered is overwhelming.
Rather than pretending to decisively explain the war, we will
instead provide an analytical approach to unify the treatment of the case.
We begin with the overarching question: How did the
implementation of COIN strategy and tactics, as outlined in the field
manual, match up with outcomes on the ground? What alternate
explanations exist for these outcomes?
18
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To answer these questions, we introduce a specific analytical
framework to guide the selection of facts, topics, and subjects in the
sections that follow, as well as to identify important open questions and
data requirements needed to evaluate them. While we can't decisively
explain the war here, it is important to realize that there are greatly
different potential explanations for its course, which furthermore differ by
region. The main objective of this study is to show the existence and
plausibility of different explanations, as well as the breadth of doctrinal
and organizational tools practitioners should understand when they find
themselves thrown into irregular war. This analytical framework is useful
not only for understanding history but also as a model for the practice of
COIN. If different segments of the population engage in different
insurgent or counterinsurgent behaviors for different motivations, then it’s
important for practitioners to understand how their actions may trigger
movement through these different categories.
We will apply the framework to the war in Iraq. The empirical case
begins with an overview of the primary actors and their interaction in the
early part of the war during the invasion in 2003 and its aftermath over the
next two years. As you read, ask why different groups behaved as they
did, and how Coalition Forces might have been able to shape behavior
differently.
Using the categories of the framework, we can analytically
distinguish four different strategies6 for countering insurgency:
1.
2.
3.
4.

“clear, hold, build” tactics popularized in U.S. COIN doctrine;
decapitation, or leadership targeting of insurgent organizations;
ethnic homogenization in the course of civil war;
mobilization of non-state armed communities.

6

As will be discussed later, ethnic homogenization need not be an adopted strategy but
can occur without any strategic intent by the counterinsurgent
19
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We will discuss the relative performance of these explanations in
four different regions of Iraq: the Kurdish North, the Sunni West, the Shia
South, and ethnically mixed Baghdad. Finally, we conclude with a brief
summary and discussion of doctrinal and methodological issues raised by
the case. Annex 1 at the end of the case provides a single table that
summarizes the operational lessons of how different COIN force
behaviors can affect different insurgency behavior.

Discussion Questions
1. How do these different strategies/forces work differently in each
area?
2. What additional information would you need to find out?
3. If you were deployed in Iraq, does your experience contrast with
our interpretations?

20
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II. Analytical Framework
A. Spectrum of Individual Roles
In studying any insurgency, one key methodological issue is the
level of analysis. In some cases, ethnic and religious groups could be the
unit of analysis (for example, Tamils and Sinhalese in Sri Lanka or Kurds,
Shia, and Sunnis in Iraq). Alternatively, organizations could be the unit of
analysis (the IRA in Northern Ireland; al-Qaeda, tribal militia, government
security forces in Iraq). At the most fundamental level, however,
individual decisions determine variation within an insurgency. If seen
primarily as political contests, the outcome of an insurgency is determined
not only by the actions of ethnic and religious group leaders or violent
organizations, but by the decisions of individuals across society. In this
case study, our analysis begins at the most basic level—individual
decisions about what roles to adopt during a contest between the
government and insurgents.
Insurgency involves individuals moving across a set of possible
roles. In much of the insurgency/rebellion literature, individuals are
portrayed as deciding betwen just two choices, either to “rebel” or “not
rebel,”– and then the analyst tries to determine the payoff structures
between these two choices. Such treatment obfuscates the set of individual
roles underlying most insurgencies. More realistically, individuals move
along a set of roles that can be aligned on the spectrum shown in Figure 1
below.

21
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Figure 1: Spectrum of Participation in Insurgency and
Counterinsurgency

Neutral (0): During any conflict between a government and its
opponent, many individuals will choose neutrality; these actors
will try to avoid both sides and go about their daily lives with a
minimum of risk. They will not willingly provide information or
material support to either the government or the insurgents, nor
will they participate in public demonstrations for either side.
Unarmed, unorganized insurgent supporter (-1): While avoiding
any armed role, some individuals will occasionally provide
information, shelter, and material support for the insurgents.
While unorganized, these individuals may show up at rallies
supporting the insurgents and will boycott elections and other
activities that could legitimize the government.
Armed local insurgent (-2): Some individuals will adopt a role of
direct and organized participation in a locally based, armed
organization. In the absence of a powerful state, individuals in
this role often take the form of local militia members. In the
presence of a powerful state, such individuals may appear as
uninvolved citizens by day but play the role of active fighter at
night. Even the most powerful states can have trouble identifying
and neutralizing actors in this role.
22

LINDSAY AND PETERSEN: VARIETIES OF INSURGENCY AND COUNTERINSURGENCY IN IRAQ, 20032009

Mobile armed insurgent (-3): Some individuals will join mobile
and armed organizations, becoming members in a guerrilla unit
or rebel army. These individuals will fight outside of their own
local communities.
These four roles form one side of a spectrum of participation. At
the onset of an occupation or violent conflict, many individuals will begin
at neutrality but then move into a support role (-1) and then move on into
even more committed and violent roles (-2, -3). Of course, individuals
may also move along a parallel set of roles in support of the government.
These roles basically mirror those above:
Unarmed, unorganized government supporter (+1): While
avoiding any armed or organized role, some individuals will
willingly identify insurgents and provide the government with
valuable information about insurgent activity. These individuals
may show up at rallies supporting the government and will be
inclined to vote in elections and participate in other activities that
legitimize the government.
Armed local government supporter (+2): Some individuals will
adopt a role of direct and organized participation in a locally
based, armed organization that is either formally or informally
connected with the government. In Iraq, organizations such as the
Sons of Anbar provided these roles. More formally, states often
develop paramilitary organizations or expanded police forces that
create opportunities for armed local government support.
Mobile armed government forces (+3): Some individuals will
join the mobile and armed organizations of the government,
namely, the state’s military.
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In later sections of this study, we will use this spectrum to analyze
the state of insurgency in different regions of Iraq. For each region, we
will assess the population’s distribution and movement on this spectrum.
We will also use this spectrum of roles to analyze counterinsurgency
practice. Obviously, the government wants to either neutralize individuals
on the left side of spectrum or take actions to move those individuals to
roles on the right side of the spectrum. The government will also wish to
prevent leftward movement. A few points should be emphasized here.
First, these roles are based on observable behavior and not attitudes.
Second, it is critical to emphasize that the same individuals pass through
different roles in the course of insurgency. The next question is what
drives them along this spectrum, the focus of the following section.
Discussion Questions
1. Behaviors are often reflective of necessities, not beliefs. Does a
public rally in support of a dictator indicate that the population is
moving from neutral, 0, to +1? How can this difference be
distinguished?
2. How can “true” movement on the scale be differentiated from
opportunistic movement? Can this only be done in retrospect, or
can it be done at the time of change?
3. What might be the impact of intended conformity versus incidental
conformity. All men in a given culture may wear beards, but not all
are Taliban. How can we tell the difference?

B. Forces That Move Individuals Along the Spectrum of
Roles
Keeping with our goal of breaking down insurgency into its most
elemental parts, we seek to identify the small, generalizable forces that
drive individuals across this spectrum of roles. In social science language,
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these small causal forces are often called mechanisms. Mechanisms are
specific causal patterns that explain individual actions over a wide range
of settings.7
Consider one particular example: the tyranny of sunk costs. An old
automobile that is constantly breaking down and being repaired might be
retained by the owner despite the likelihood of numerous additional costly
repairs. Although the optimal choice might be to “junk” the car, the owner
refuses to rationally calculate probable future costs because he or she
cannot bear the thought of previous repair efforts “going down the drain.”
The same process might be involved in dysfunctional personal
relationships or marriages. One or both partners in a relationship may find
themselves continuously dissatisfied, in conflict, and on the verge of
breaking up. Rather than ending the relationship, they may choose to
remain together and ignore the probability that problems will recur,
because they cannot accept the fact that investments in the relationship
have been in vain. The tyranny of sunk costs mechanism is both general in
that it can be applied to a wide variety of cases (cars and spouses) and
specific and causal in that it explains why an event occurs. This
combination of generality and specificity is one of the benefits of a
mechanism approach. Another benefit is the wide possible range of
behaviors that mechanisms can encompass. Irrational psychological
processes such as the tyranny of sunk costs or cognitive dissonance
reduction are mechanisms, but so are rational adaptation and social norms.
Concentration on mechanisms allows the social scientist to deal with
7

The mechanism approach can be clearly contrasted with common alternatives. Variablebased treatments usually aim to estimate causal influence through statistical association.
In this method, prediction becomes the primary goal. In opposition, a mechanism
approach aims for explanation over prediction. For a discussion of the use of a
mechanisms approach, see Peter Hedstrom and Richard Swedborg, eds. Social
Mechanisms: An Analytical Approach to Social Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1998). Also, see Jon Elster, Alchemies of the Mind: Rationality and the
Emotions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), especially the first chapter,
“A Plea for Mechanisms.” Also see Roger Petersen, “Structures and Mechanisms in
Comparison,” in Roger Petersen and John Bowen, eds., Critical Comparisons in Politics
and Culture, (Cambridge University Press, 1999).
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realistic actors affected by a complex variety of forces; it forces the social
scientist toward causal explanations of increasingly finer grain.
The question here is what specific mechanisms are at play at
specific points on the spectrum. What mechanisms move individuals from
-1 (insurgent support) to neutrality (0) or government support (+1)? What
mechanisms move individuals into insurgent armed roles (either at the -2
or -3 level)?
Several types of mechanisms are at play in insurgency. Developed
from knowledge of a variety of cases of insurgency, we will briefly list six
types of mechanisms that can theoretically play a role: rational calculation,
focal points, social norms, emotions, status considerations, and
psychological mechanisms.
Rational Calculation
The mechanism underlying most theories of insurgency is
instrumental rational choice related to a relatively narrow set of economic
and security values. Individuals are seen as coldly calculating costs on the
one hand and benefits on the other. In terms of the spectrum of roles, if an
individual is at -1, he will calculate the costs and benefits of remaining at 1 versus the costs and benefits of moving to another role. For most
individuals, the most possible and likely move is to an adjacent position.
For the individual at -1, the choice set may be to either move to -2 (joining
up with a local insurgent group) or to play things safe and move into a
neutral role (0). Much counterinsurgency theory concentrates on “sticks
and carrots” used to influence the operation of this rational calculation
mechanism. Early practice in Iraq reflected the focus on this mechanism.
In the words of an American military colonel serving in Iraq in 2003:
"With a heavy dose of fear and violence, and a lot of money for projects, I
think we can convince these people that we are here to help them."8

8Dexter Filkins quoting Colonel Sassaman in the New York Times, December 7, 2003,
"Tough New Tactics by U.S. Tighten Grip on Iraq Towns."
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If rational calculations are driving action in insurgency, what are
the calculations about? As illustrated in the quotation above, practitioners
concentrate on calculations about safety and economic values. Invasion,
occupation, and insurgency are likely to disrupt the economy. Individuals
will often have to deal with unemployment and black markets. Sometimes,
individuals may find occupying one role or another on the spectrum to be
instrumental for economic survival, for instance, joining the government
police (+2) or military (+3) to get a paycheck.
While economic calculations are fairly straightforward, safety
calculations may be more complex. One of the primary inputs when
calculating threats is a “safety in numbers” estimation. If an individual is
at the neutral position (0), he or she will not wish to move to support of
insurgents (-1 or -2) unless enough other individuals are also moving to
that position to create a “safety in numbers” effect. It is dangerous to be
one of a few individuals moving to a risk-laden role.
Focal Points
This discussion of “safety in numbers” leads into a consideration
of informational mechanisms: How does an individual gauge how many
others are moving to positions across the spectrum? Individual decisions
depend on the decisions of others. Is the rest of the population moving out
of neutrality toward government support, or is it moving the other way,
toward the insurgents? Here, focal points may become important. Focal
points are events, places, or dates that help to coordinate expectations and
thus actions. For governments, elections can serve as focal points. The
election is held on a specific day and requires voters to go to specific
locations. Every individual can see how many others are going to the
polls. For the government, a massive turnout can signal its legitimacy.
Through high election turnout, neutrals and those sympathetic to the
insurgents must face the fact that a majority of the population favors the
government. Wavering individuals may adjust their behavior accordingly
by moving rightward on the spectrum. In January 2005, 8 million Iraqi
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voters went to the polls to cast their first post-election votes in the election
of the transitional national assembly. Every newspaper around the world
showed voters holding up a blue finger, indicating that they had braved
threats to participate in a primary political institution of the new regime. In
Shia areas, the election probably helped solidify the perception of societal
movement to the +1 level. On the other hand, the lack of blue fingers in
Sunni areas, where the majority of voters boycotted the election, may have
provided a signal that significant numbers of the local population
remained at 0 or -1.
On the other side, insurgents may use specific holidays and
locations to stage anti-government rallies. Religion, by its regular timing
of holidays and rituals, often provides focal points. As an essential part of
Islamic religious practice in Iraq, Friday sermons provide a regular basis
for interaction and communication. More specific religious holidays also
can provide a vehicle for shaping expectations about the progression of the
conflict. For example, in March 2004 the Shia faithful were, for the first
time in 20 years, free to celebrate the Ashura, the anniversary of the death
of Imam Hussein in 680 and a founding event of Shiism. With majority
rule coming in the wake of the invasion, the celebration of this event
would mark the first time in history that the Shia might take power in an
Arab country. This event thus was loaded with intense symbolism.
Furthermore, the event entailed the physical gathering of thousands of
Shia pilgrims at religious shrines. It also provided an ideal opportunity for
Sunni jihadists to shape perceptions of conflict. After Sunni groups sent
suicide bombers into throngs of Shia worshipers, expectations of further
sectarian violence skyrocketed, and faith in the coalition;s and government
force’s ability to control and protect plummeted.
Social Norms
Under the influence of social norms, individuals do not calculate
costs and benefits but rather follow accepted rules of behavior. Norms are
often customary rules that coordinate actions with others. Social norms
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can be crucial mechanisms in insurgencies in societies with strong family,
clan, or tribal elements. For example, consider an individual member of a
clan who wishes to remain neutral (at the 0 level) early in the conflict. If
other members of the clan move to -1 support, the social norms of the clan
will also impel this individual to support the insurgents in similar fashion.
If the clan moves to -2 level of organized and armed support, this
individual, following social norms of reciprocity, will likely be pulled
along despite a personal inclination toward neutrality. Counterinsurgents
may try to influence this individual’s calculus through a set of individually
targeted threats (prison) or benefits (payoffs, amnesty), but if the group
norm is strong, these sticks and carrots may not produce their intended
effect.
The power and meaning of contemporary clan and tribal
membership can be difficult to understand and varies by region, but
certainly these groups have often created strong social norms that have
been a crucial basis of politics over the course of Iraqi history.9 Before the
presence of any centralized government in the region, clans performed
self-policing and alliance formation through their inherent social norms of
punishment and revenge. As Hechter and Kabiri summarize:
Clans forged alliances based on the notion that “anyone who
commits an act of aggression against any one of us must expect
retaliation from us all, and not only will the aggressor himself be
likely to suffer retaliation, but his entire group and all its
members will be equally liable.” This principle led to a system of
strong self-policing tribal groups that defended themselves by
threatening to retaliate, and often retaliating, against individuals
of aggressor groups. Because these tribes relied only on
themselves for protection from outside threats, they had to
9

For further reading on tribes and clans and their role in contemporary conflict, see
Chapter 3 in Richard H. Shultz & Andrea J. Dew Insurgents, Terrorists, and Militias:
The Warriors of Contemporary Conflict (New York: Columbia 2006).
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develop effective means for self-defense: they amassed enough
weapons and knowledge of warfare to become mini-states.10
As the Ottomans established power and increased government
penetration of society in Iraq, for instance, they built upon these existing
tribal structures. The Ottoman Land Law of 1858 allowed the state to pass
out title deeds to individuals. In practice, these deeds were given to tribal
sheiks who in turn governed their tribesmen. The Ottomans played off
some sheiks against others in a tribally oriented divide-and-rule game.
When disorder and rebellion arose, relying on tribes was again an effective
way to reestablish order. In 1910, one Ottoman official in Baghdad wrote,
“To depend on the tribe is a thousand times safer than depending on the
government, for whereas the latter defers or neglects repression, the tribe,
no matter how feeble it may be, as soon as it learns that an injustice has
been committed against one of its members readies itself to exact
vengeance on his behalf.”11 The question for the present study is how
much these social norms of clan and tribe were operative in the periods of
relative chaos following the 2003 invasion. Their strength seems apparent.
As seen in the empirical material below, these norms were often clearly a
basis for insurgent mobilization at the local level.
Emotions
Violent insurgencies often involve death, destruction, and
desecration—all of which can create powerful emotions. During
insurgencies, either the situation itself or political entrepreneurs are likely
to create the emotion of anger or the emotion of fear, both of which can
Michael Hechter and Nika Kabiri, “Attaining Social Order in Iraq,” in Stathis Kalyvas,
Ian Shapiro, and Tarek Masoud eds. Order, Conflict, and Violence (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2008) pp. 51-52. The quoted passage within is from Ernest
Gellner, “Trust, Cohesion, and Social Order,” in Theories of Social Order: A Reader,
Michael Hechter and Christine Thorne, eds. (Stanford: Stanford University Press), pp.
310-316.
11
Hanna Batatu, The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movement of Iraq
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978), p. 21. Cited in Hechter and Kabiri, p. 54.
10
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move individuals along the spectrum. Anger results from the belief that an
actor has committed a bad action against one’s self or group. Under the
influence of anger, individuals no longer calculate costs and benefits in a
straightforward way. Under anger, they downgrade risks and skew
information processing in ways that allow for the pursuit of revenge. In
terms of the spectrum of roles, under anger individuals will feel compelled
to move out of neutrality into a more active role. Under the influence of
fear, on the other hand, individual perceptions of danger become
heightened. Individuals may feel compelled to seek safety in ethnically
homogenous areas, or to join local militias (-2, +2) as a form of protection.
As with social norms, the emotions of anger and fear affect behavior in
ways that can override the “sticks and carrots” policies of an occupier.
One of the most well-know examples of an anger-based strategy is
the effort by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the leader of al-Qaeda in Iraq, to
foment civil war between Sunnis and Shiites.12 Here is a description of his
strategy, based largely on a captured letter of al-Zarqawi:
As Zarqawi described in his letter and subsequent broadcasts, his
strategy in Iraq is to strike at the Shia—and therefore provoke a
civil war. “A nation of heretics,” the Shia “are the key element of
change,” he wrote. “If we manage to draw them onto the terrain
of partisan war, it will be possible to tear the Sunnis away from
their heedlessness, for they will feel the weight of the imminence
of danger.” Again, a strategy of provocation—which plays on an
underlying reality: that Iraq sits on the crucial sectarian fault line
of the Middle East and that a conflict there gains powerful
momentum from the involvement of neighboring states, with Iran
strongly supporting the Shia and with Saudi Arabia, Kuwait,
Jordan, and Syria strongly sympathetic to the Sunnis. More and
12

This section is taken from Roger Petersen, Western Intervention in the Balkans: The
Strategic Use of Emotion in Conflict (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011),
Chapter Five.
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more, you can discern this outline in the chaos of the current war,
with the Iranian-trained militias of the Shia Islamist parties that
now control the Iraqi government battling Sunni Islamists, both
Iraqi and foreign-born, and former Baathists.13
While many types of killings and bombings depend on local
incentives and constraints, the timing of elections, and other specific
factors, al-Zarqawi’s targets followed the general logic of creating anger
and spiraling violence, at least in its early renditions.14 The target set
included motorcades of specific Shiite political figures. Insurgents
attacked the Islamic Dawa Party, car-bombed Sadr’s office in the Shuala
district of Baghdad, and hit police stations associated with Shiite
dominance in Karada, Saydiyah, and other towns. One summary statement
written in May 2005 read, “Political leaders fear that insurgents have
intensified their campaign to drive a wedge between Sunnis and Shiites
and that they are trying to ignite a civil war. Last month, Shiite leaders
accused the largest Shiite militia force of complicity in the killing of Sunni
clerics.”15 The idea behind this strategy was to create anger in those who
already have a clear ethnic identity in order to produce retaliation and
begin a spiral of violence. It is the political and security elites who are
most able to retaliate violently and set the spiral in motion. Several June
2005 reports of violence describe revenge killings of Sunni in response to
killings or attacks on Shiites.16
Certainly, the bombing of the golden dome in Samarra in February
2006 fits the strategy. The shrine was central to Shiite identity. The
Mark Danner, “Taking Stock of the Forever War,” New York Times, September 11,
2005.
14
I am basing this judgment on data collected from my research assistant Jessica Karnis,
who compiled a list of bombings based on information and descriptions from Iraq Body
Count, the New York Times, and other sources. -R.P.
15
Richard Oppel and Sabrina Tavernise, with Warzer Jaff and Layla Istifan, “Car
Bombings in Iraq Kill 33, with Shiites as Targets,” New York Times, May 24, 2005.
16
See for example, John Burns, “Three Car Bombs Leave 18 Dead and 46 Hurt in a
Shiite Suburb of Baghdad,” New York Times, June 23, 2005.
13
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quotations given to reporters after the bombing are textbook responses to
an anger-based strategy:
“The war could really be on now,” says Abu Hassan, a Shiite
street peddler who declined to give his full name. “This is
something greater and more symbolic than attacks on people.
This is a strike at who we are.”17
“If I could find the people who did this, I would cut him
to pieces,” said Abdel Jaleel al-Sudani, a 50-year-old employee
of the Health Ministry, who said he had marched in a
demonstration earlier. “I would rather hear of the death of a
friend, than to hear this news.”18
Within hours of the attack, thousands of Shiites took to the streets
in protest, many of them brandishing arms. Over 20 Sunni mosques were
burned in retaliation.19
In addition to anger, one of the most relevant emotions to invasion,
occupation, and state-building is resentment. Perceptions of unjust group
subordination create this emotion. Prior to the conflict, group A might
have held most of the visible positions of power and authority over groups
B and C. After the invasion, the formerly subordinate groups B and C may
be able to assert new dominance over A. Much recent scholarship has
shown the power of group status reversals. Once a group has established
itself in the dominant position in an ethnic status hierarchy, they do not
readily accept subordination (or even equality). In a sweeping statistical
study, Lars-Erik Cederman and his collaborators have found that groups
Dan Murphy, “Attack Deepens Iraq’s Divide,” Christian Science Monitor, February
23, 2006.
18
Edward Wong, “Blast Destroys Golden Dome of Sacred Shiite Shrine in Iraq,” New
York Times February 22, 2006.
19
The Christian Science Monitor put the number at 29, while the New York Times
provided a number of 25 mosques “burned, taken over, or attacked with a variety of
weapons.”
17
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that have undergone status reversals, such as group A in the example
above, are about five times more likely to mobilize for violence than
comparable groups that did not experience status reversals.20
Status Considerations
While resentment forms from group-based status
considerations, individuals may also have status considerations
within their community. In many cultures, becoming a visible early
supporter or organizer may confer status as a “leader” or “big
man.” Shadid describes how some local community members
became first movers within the contours of Muqtada al-Sadr’s
organization:
His men were from the community, and to the community they
returned ... They spoke the vernacular of the neighborhood; they
grasped, almost intuitively, its concerns; and they offered
answers to countless questions, in face-to-face conversations in
the cramped rooms of street-corner mosques. Through their work,
Sadr and his men laid claim—vigorously contested—to
leadership of the emerging community. As a motto and an
approach they quoted a popular Quranic verse, as the clergy are
want to do: “Those sitting are not equal to those struggling, even
though each as been promised well by God.”21

Lars-Erik Cedarman, Andreas Wimmer, and Brian Min, “Why do Ethnic Groups
Rebel?: New Data and Analysis,” World Politics 62 (2010): 87-119. Their extensive new
data base contains nearly 30,000 observations. Strong support for the effect of resentment
status reversals is also found in Donald Horowitz Ethnic Groups in Conflict (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 2000).
21
Anthony Shadid, Night Draws Near: Iraq’s People in the Shadow of America’s War
(New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2005), pp. 182-183.
20
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Psychological Mechanisms
Finally, several psychological mechanisms have relevance for
insurgency. While some of the mechanisms above help explain the
“triggering” of insurgency (movement from 0 to -1 and -1 to -2),
psychological mechanisms would appear to most help explain how
insurgency is sustained (staying at -2, -3) in the face of declining insurgent
power. The tyranny of sunk costs has been mentioned above. After blood
has been shed, individuals will tend to believe that it must have been shed
for a worthwhile purpose; it is difficult to accept that lives may have been
lost in vain. In Islamic societies (as well as other religious traditions), the
concept of martyrdom adds additional meaning to those killed during
struggle. As Anthony Shadid writes of Sunni perceptions of fallen Islamic
fighters, “To many, those who fell in its battles were remembered better
by their deaths than by their lives. They were shuhada, martyrs.”22 Those
at the -2 and -3 levels will be compelled to fight on even in the face of
powerful government “sticks.” There is also the “tyranny of small
victories.” In this case, the ability to inflict some pain on the government,
that is, to carry out occasional successful operations against the
government, will distort a rational evaluation of the overall course of the
conflict.

Discussion Questions
1. Do these mechanisms hold true for every society, and for all types
of insurgency?
2. What other cultural mechanisms might play a role in moving
someone along the spectrum of anti-government to progovernment, or vice versa?
3. How can COIN or troops on the ground affect these mechanisms?

22

Shadid, p. 292.
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C. General Connections Among Types of Mechanisms
and Movement on the Spectrum of Roles
Thus far we have identified a spectrum of roles and a set of
mechanisms capable of effecting individual action along that spectrum.
The next task is to specify which mechanisms are likely to be operative
between specific nodes of that spectrum. Through identifying a sequence
of mechanisms, we can identify processes that might trigger and sustain
insurgency. Figure 2 can be used for reference.23

23

All models are simplifications that highlight some insights about the world while
obscuring other interesting features. Three clarifications are in order so as not to draw
unreasonable interpretations from this simple diagram.
First, this spectrum indicates different categories of behavior, not necessarily
loyalty. Clearly, many real wars involve more, and often many more, than two parties. A
government fighting a domestic rebellion is a different animal from a foreign intervention
to combat third-party-funded terrorists. Yet when any two sides in even complex
conflicts are taken into considerations, it should be possible to distinguish these different
behavioral levels of mobilization.
Second, although the linear spectrum shows points to be equally spaced, clearly
there are usually far more people, relatively speaking, in the center (+1,0,-1), with only a
small handful of active combatants at the extremes. It becomes more dangerous to move
to the extremes, thus more costly to do so, thus less likely that it will happen. The model
is meant to focus on the fact that there are different behavioral categories and different
mechanisms for moving among them.
Third, this model focuses on movements in sequence from one category to one
of the adjacent categories. Often, people jump around. For example, it’s not uncommon
for trained security forces (+3) to move into a clandestine rebellion role (-3) after an
invasion or in unconventional warfare operations, or for local insurgencies (-2) to switch
to self-defense forces (+2). This is something that could be better developed within the
model, although we should expect similar mechanisms to be triggering and sustaining
participation at any given level, whatever the complicated history getting there.
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Figure 2: Triggering, Counter-Triggering, and Sustaining
Mechanisms for Insurgency and Counterinsurgency
0 to -1 or +1: The movement off of neutrality (either from 0 to 1, or 0 to +1) will likely involve a combination of mechanisms—
emotions, rational calculation of safety, focal points, and status
consideration. First is the question of motivation. Here, the
emotion of resentment can be critical. At the beginning of an
invasion or the time of state collapse, ethnic groups may exist in
a hierarchy. Members of pre-conflict subordinate group C will act
to change their position against former dominant group A. They
can do this through cooperation with a foreign occupier (move to
+1) or violence against A, or both. Group A, now experiencing a
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status reversal, may move toward support of insurgents who are
fighting against the new ethnic hierarchy (thus moving to -1).
Motivations, however, are only one part of the story. An
individual may feel compelled to act but will still desire some
signals and assurances about how to act. Movement from
neutrality still requires a set of first movers to serve as an
example and show that action is possible. Local leaders, some
seeking to gain or preserve their own status, can act as first
movers.
In some situations, focal points may provide information about
“safety in numbers.” Working together, the mechanisms of
resentment, status seeking, and focal points can provide the
motivation, leadership, and information to push individuals
quickly out of the neutral position.
-1 to -2: The movement into armed roles of insurgent resistance
involves higher risk. When individuals decide to pick up a gun
and take on heightened chances of killing or being killed, they are
more likely to be driven by mechanisms inextricably linked to
powerful forces in their local communities. For this decision,
social norms are potent mechanisms. Individuals often join local,
armed groups when they are pulled in by the norms of family,
clan, or other groups with tight bonds. For movement into the
pivotal -2 position, the relationship of “first actors,” those willing
to take high risks to violently act against the government, with
other members in their community is crucial. If first actors are
deeply embedded within tight-knit communities, or are in a
position of leadership in those communities, they can act as
catalysts to move much of the community from the 0 or -1
positions to the armed, local -2 level.
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+1 to +2: This movement may involve similar community-level
social norms and safety considerations as -1 to -2. Local leaders
can activate social norms to move their communities to a position
of organized government support. Also, a clear economic
component operates on this side of the spectrum. The government
can develop relatively well-paid expanded local police forces,
paramilitaries, or militias.
Movement into -3 and +3: The -3 and +3 roles involve formal
organizations. Al-Qaeda provides the prime example on the left
side, while the military is the best example on the right side of the
spectrum. Individuals often join these organizations for
ideological/religious/patriotic or economic reasons. These
organizations have ideologies, bureaucracies, rules and
punishments, and regular payments to members. The purpose of
these organizations is to routinize violent action. Organizational
goals include creation of internal norms that build cohesiveness,
development of rules that constrain emotions, establishment of
ranked status system, and salaries. In short, at this level the
organization subsumes the individual mechanisms discussed
above. For less organized individuals, the nature of the society
and the shocks of the insurgency produce the norms, emotions,
and information that drive behavior. For organized individuals, it
is the organization itself that controls (or tries to control) these
forces. If the insurgency is fought mainly between two mobile
and armed groups, then the organization rather than the
individual should become the main unit of analysis. While
organizations are important in Iraq, we argue that they are one
factor among many.
Sustaining -2, -3: Insurgent organizations sustain themselves
through rational mechanisms such as coercion and threats against
39
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defectors, but also through psychological mechanisms such as the
tyranny of sunk costs, small victories, and wishful thinking.
Sustaining +2, +3: Governments sustain armed organization
through pay, discipline, and the demonstration of the inevitability
of government victory.
Figure 2 serves as a theoretical template that outlines a set of
mechanisms and processes that trigger and sustain insurgency. While few
insurgencies may proceed in exactly this fashion, the framework serves to
focus the analysis of any specific insurgency. It forces the analyst to look
for the smaller-grained causal forces that move individuals across a set of
connected roles. The mechanisms and process approach is a middle
ground between a variables-based method and description. This method is
particularly well-suited to analyze complex events like insurgency.
Furthermore, the framework allows for the systematic analysis of
our central question on counterinsurgency strategy. As outlined below,
this framework helps specify the logic of any given strategy:
1.
Where does the strategy concentrate its resources—at
which nodes on the spectrum?
2.
If the strategy aims to prevent or create certain types of
movement along the spectrum, does the strategy’s logic actually
engage the mechanisms that drive actors’ behaviors at those
junctures?
To prevent people from shifting toward the negative end of the
spectrum, it is necessary to inhibit the mechanisms that trigger and sustain
shifts toward insurgency. See Table 1 below. For example, to counter
resentment formation, the counterinsurgent can include members of the
newly disenfranchised group in local governance (such as regular tribal
council meetings) and work to control targeting errors (false positives and
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indiscriminate violence). To alter safety calculations, population control
(barriers to entry and movement, ID cards, biometric surveys) is critical,
as is a robust intelligence program to improve targeting precision against
level -2 and -3 insurgents. To counter normative mechanisms, local elites
can be encouraged (perhaps through bribing them with contracts for civil
affairs projects) to publicly shame insurgents and lead their tribes to stand
down insurgent activity. To counter sustaining mechanisms, amnesty and
protection programs for defectors and informants are crucial, as are truthbased information campaigns to publicize insurgent defeats and atrocities.
To counter a -3 insurgent organization, its bureaucratic processes and
participants must be disrupted, subverted, or destroyed.
To encourage people to shift toward the positive end of the
spectrum, the counterinsurgent can try to enable mechanisms that trigger
and sustain shifts in that direction. Information campaigns should
encourage resentment against insurgents for usurping power and resources
and for committing indiscriminate atrocities, and should emphasize the
prestige and heroism of people that stand up against the insurgents. For
example, following the assassination by al-Qaeda of Sheikh Sattar alRishawi, founder of the Anbar Awakening movement, posters and buttons
celebrating the martyrdom of “The Lion of Anbar” and exhorting Anbaris
to continue the fight appeared all over Ramadi. The campaigns must be
conducted with a high level of cultural fluency (and ideally conducted by
indigenous groups themselves) to avoid negative cultural focal points and
to exploit the positive ones.24 Local self-defense groups can be formed by
improving safety thresholds for participating, emphasizing the prestige of
self-defense, and forming groups with some prior tribal or community
association. Sustaining mechanisms to maintain government security force
integrity include counter-intelligence activities, professionalization, and

24

Iraqis can put up some effective if obscene propaganda that would never be approved
through American PSYOP channels. Sometimes the best PSYOP program might simply
be providing computers and printers for indigenous partners.
41

LINDSAY AND PETERSEN: VARIETIES OF INSURGENCY AND COUNTERINSURGENCY IN IRAQ, 20032009

disciplinary measures, as well as emphases on esprit de corps, patriotism,
and combat successes.
Table 1 relates the mechanisms driving individuals along the
spectrum to counterinsurgency practices aimed at affecting the operation
of those mechanisms. The columns in Table 1 show the valence of shifts,
while the rows show the degree of participation, thus preserving the
symmetry between insurgent and COIN participation. Column I lists a
typology of the mechanisms that generate rebellion, and columns II and III
provide a typology of correlated mechanisms for its suppression. For
simplicity, we collapse the level two and three sustaining mechanisms.
The COIN measures listed in Table 1 or Figure 3 below have all
been described in detail in military doctrine, COIN histories, and
practitioner memoirs, yet these sources freely mix up the various
mechanisms in an ad hoc fashion with generic comment on the complexity
and political nature of COIN. What is thus unique here is gathering these
measures together into a coherent theoretical framework that shows how
they work within the mechanisms that create or abate insurgency. This
framework cannot by itself provide any prescription for how to balance
these measures and allocate resources among them, since that would
depend on the particular distribution of popular participation in each
particular conflict. The goal in this theory is a more preliminary theoretical
justification for various types of COIN operations, and to provide a basis
for the common doctrinal exhortation to synergize and coordinate a wide
range of operations in COIN.
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Table 1: Insurgency Triggering/Sustaining Mechanisms and
COIN-Inhibiting Measures
I. Trigger shift toward
insurgency (- )

II. Inhibit shift toward
insurgency (0)

III. Trigger shift toward
government ( +)

A.
Unorganized
support
(+/- 1)

• Resentment
(status inversions;
indiscriminate COIN
violence)
• Safety calculation
(society-wide)
• Status (heroic first
mover)
• Focal points (culturally
specific)

• Create political
enfranchisement and
honorable opportunities;
Control targeting errors &
protect population
• Censure antigovernment displays (can
increase resentment!)
• Publicize insurgent
atrocities, ridicule
radicalism
• Avoid negative focal
points that resonate for
insurgents

• Encourage resentment
against insurgents,
publicize & exploit
atrocities
• Protect, encourage
displays of support for
COIN
• Emphasize COIN
heroism, prestige of
defying insurgents
• Leverage positive focal
points

B. Local
Organized
Support
(+/- 2)

• Safety calculations
(community)
• Reciprocity/honor
(local norms)
• Material incentives

• Lower safety levels for
insurgents: Improve
intelligence coverage,
targeting precision,
population control (ID
cards, biometrics, barriers,
etc.)
• Respect legal/human
rights; Engage & respect
local elites, encourage
elites to shame insurgents
• Alternative employment,
bribes

• Protect/enable selfdefense groups
• Encourage local elites
to reinforce prestige of
self-defense
• Fund self-defense
groups, offer rewards
for info & bounties

Level of
Participation
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C. Mobile
Combatant
Organization
(+/- 3)

• Ideological
commitment
• Bureaucratic
organization
• Material incentives

D. Organized
Action
(Sustain at
+/- 2 or 3)

• Coercion
• Irrationality (small
victories; sunk costs;
wishful thinking)

• Reduce ideological
appeal; isolate/attrite true
believers
• Disrupt/destroy/subvert
insurgent logistics,
administration, and
command
• Disrupt insurgent
finance; alternative
employment
• Amnesty programs,
protect informants &
defectors
• Attrite insurgents;
publicize COIN successes;
discredit insurgent
propaganda
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• Enhance patriotism,
esprit de corps,
professionalism
• Strengthen
administrative capacity
& reliability; fight
corruption
• Pay security forces
fairly & reliably
• Strengthen
counterintelligence and
security force discipline
• Demonstrate progress,
emphasize inevitable
victory
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III. Varieties of Counterinsurgency
We now can directly return to our central question: How did the
implementation of COIN strategy and tactics, as outlined in the field
manual, match up with outcomes on the ground? What alternate
explanations exist for these outcomes?
The central strategic logic of FM 3-24 is the strategy of “Clear,
Hold, Build.” Indeed, US forces implemented this strategy in many
locations in Iraq. However, at least three other strategies or forces were
also being implemented or occurred at the same time: decapitation, ethnic
homogenization, and tribal mobilization. All four of these
strategies/dynamics could explain the drop in violence seen across much
of Iraq. In order to assess how and where these forces played out and to
what effect, we again rely on our analytical framework. This section
discusses the counterinsurgency logic underlying clear/hold/build,
decapitation, homogenization, and tribal mobilization. The next section
returns to a regional analysis to empirically assess the operation and
possible interactions among these strategies.

A. FM 3-24 and Clear, Hold, Build
FM 3-24 assumes that popular grievances cause small radicalized
groups to take up arms against the government, and thus that the
restoration of government legitimacy should redress these grievances. 25 It
represents the war as a triangular contest between government security
forces and coalition partners (+3), “a neutral or passive majority” of the
population (-1 to +1), and irreconcilable insurgents (-3).26 Proactive
community resistance (-2) and government-aligned local militias (+2) are
25

Stathis N. Kalyvas, "Review: The New U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency
Field Manual," Perspectives on Politics vol. 6, no. 2 (2008): 351-353
26
FM 3-24, 1-20, Fig. 1-2. The assumption of passiveness on the part of the population is
implicit in military jargon such as “human terrain;” terrain confers advantages and it can
be lost, dominated, or shaped, but it is not a willful and reactive entity (thanks to Colin
Jackson for this point).
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ignored or lumped into the other categories.27 Coalition COIN forces thus
focus simultaneously on three tasks: first, they recruit and train
professional indigenous military and police forces; second, economic
development and propaganda (“information operations”) to “win hearts
and minds” converts angry or resentful -1s to supportive +1s; third, they
kill or capture insurgents using intelligence tips from the converted
population and take great pains to minimize collateral damage. Thus the
newly-won +1s enable the newl -trained +3s to separate the newly
delegitimized -3s from the population.28 These three tasks are manpowerintensive, although the commonly cited heuristic of ten counterinsurgents
per rebel is questionable.29 Large force ratios are necessary but not
sufficient: there must be sufficient “boots on the ground” long enough to
“clear” populated areas of insurgents, “hold” them against relapse into
violence, and “build” legitimate institutions.30 The primary focus is on the
development of legitimate economic and political institutions. Success
builds on success as the “oil spot” of stability spreads.

B. Alternative Strategies
Decapitation
FM 3-24 provides advice to separate the insurgents from the
population by winning the hearts and minds of the latter through economic
development and propaganda and training security forces to protect them.
27

We are describing COIN as ideally described in FM 3-24. In practice, U.S. forces
absolutely did deal with level-2 populations, especially with the tribes in Anbar, but this
is theoretically a different mechanism because of the direction of agency, as discussed in
the section on tribal mobilization.
28
For a formal explication of this three-way bidding contest see Eli Berman, Jacob N.
Shapiro and Joseph H. Felter, "Can Hearts and Minds Be Bought? The Economics of
Counterinsurgency in Iraq," Journal of Political Economy (forthcoming, 2011)
29
Jeffrey Friedman, “Boots on the Ground: The Significance of Manpower in
Counterinsurgency,” paper presented at Strategic Use of Force Working Group, MIT
Center for International Studies, 24 February 2010
30
FM 3-24, 5-18-5-23
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Another approach is to go after insurgent organizations (-3) directly by
enhancing the acuity and coverage of surveillance and the speed and
precision of strike forces (+3). Manhunts for notorious fugitives like Pablo
Escobar, Che Guevara, or Osama bin Laden are examples of decapitation
operations or targeted killings. When manhunts are coupled together such
that intelligence from detainees and materials gathered from one raid
provides leads for new raids, then decapitation efforts are often called
“counter-network operations” or simply “counterterrorism.” U.S. SOF
describes this cyclic methodology as “find, fix, finish, exploit, analyze”
(F3EA).31 Whereas “clear, hold, build” attempts to address grievance as
the root cause of insurgency, F3EA aims to liquidate the clandestine
organizations that insurgency requires, whatever its cause. Its goal is to
kill or capture senior and mid-level insurgent commanders faster than they
are able to regenerate in order to sow fear and confusion and ultimately to
cause the network to collapse.
Decapitation has more in common with the two-way relationship
of conventional war than the triangular one of COIN, but whereas COIN
doctrine worries about the counterproductive effects of undiscriminating
“cordon and search,” “search and destroy,” or “harassment and
interdiction” on the population, decapitation is selective violence; it tries
to avoid interacting with the population much at all by seeking reliable
intelligence to trigger a raid and by keeping a discrete footprint. In
previous eras this approach has been controversial because of its reliance

31

Michael T. Flynn, Rich Juergens and Thomas L. Cantrell, "Employing ISR: SOF Best
Practices," Joint Forces Quarterly, no. 50 (2008): 56-61; Steven M. Marks, Thomas M.
Meer and Matthew T. Nilson, "Manhunting: A Methodology for Finding Persons of
National Interest," Naval Post Graduate School, Masters Thesis, June 2005. We use the
term “decapitation” loosely here to describe targeted raids against network leadership,
even if these targets are mid-level rather than senior leaders; the term “counter-network
operations” is supposed to capture this focus on the middle of the organization, not just
the head as implied by “decapitation,” but here we’ll use the term informally as a catchall
for both.
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on torture to produce actionable intelligence,32 but new technologies of
intelligence collection and analysis now enable SOF to find and fix targets
without resorting to torture.33 The targeting focus of decapitation has
much in common with the “network centric warfare” doctrine developed
for conventional warfare to enable “sensors and shooters” to “self
synchronize” in order to achieve “information dominance” over fleeting
targets;34 in its reinvention for irregular warfare, the targets are individual
insurgent commanders, the network spans military and intelligence
organizations around the globe, and the shooters are SOF assault forces.
Counterterrorism technology enables militaries to restore their preferred
two-way relationship between +3s and -3s without having to be intimately
involved with the messy population in the middle. Economic development
only matters insofar as it improves intelligence and assault operations,
such as through the improvement of communication and transportation
infrastructure.35

32

An infamous example is described by Paul Aussaresses, The Battle of the Casbah:
Terrorism and Counterterrorism in Algeria 1955-1957 (New York: Enigma Books,
2002)
33
While U.S. SOF increasingly specialize in counterterrorism, conventional forces can
and certainly do execute intelligence-driven
34
James R. Blaker, Transforming Military Force: The Legacy of Arthur Cebrowski and
Network Centric Warfare (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2007)
35
Robust communications infrastructures provide countless opportunities for Orwellian
“persistent surveillance” of the population. Jacob N. Shapiro and Nils B. Weidmann,
"Talking about Killing: Cell Phones, Collective Action, and Insurgent Violence in Iraq,"
Working Paper Presented At Princeton University Faculty Colloquium in International
Relations, 21 February 2011, report a reduction of violence in the areas where new
cellular phone towers are installed; this might result either from improved signals
intelligence collection or more phone-in tips. Individual economic development projects
can provide covers for intelligence gathering, as in an innovative British SAS scheme in
Northern Ireland to operate a laundry and test all the clothes for explosive residue, as
described in Ed Moloney, Voices from the Grave: Two Men's War in Ireland (New York:
Faber and Faber, 2010), 119-121.
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Homogenization
Many political scientists argue that the best way to end ethnic
violence is simply to physically separate the warring sides and create
defensible boundaries between them.36 There are some good examples
where ethnic homogenization certainly led to a decrease in violence.
Consider Bosnia. Ethnic cleansing had homogenized much of Bosnia’s
territory and reduced the number of contestable, and potentially violent,
hot spots. At the end of the war, Serbian forces faced off against the forces
of a Bosnian-Croatian alliance across demarcated lines that would become
the border between Republika Srpska (RS) and the Federation. The war
reduced the non-Serb population living in Republika Srpska from 46% to
3%.37 Likewise, the Serbian population in the territory of the Federation
had fallen from 17% to 3%.38 The Dayton Accord ratified already existing
spheres of control rather than needing to establish control in the first place.
A NATO-led Implementation Force (IFOR) comprised of 60,000
multinational troops soon took over to maintain peace.39 Before yielding
to an EU force in 2004, NATO troops would serve as peacekeepers in
Bosnia for nine years without a single service-related fatality.40 The
question is whether this remarkable lack of violence is the result of a large
peacekeeping force or an outcome of ethnic separation produced by the
war.
The same question can be asked in Iraq, although the path to
homogenization differed. In Bosnia, ethnic homogenization, more
accurately termed ethnic cleansing in that case, was mainly a result of a
36

The most well-known proponent of this position is Chaim Kaufmann. See Chaim
Kaufmann, “Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars,” International
Security 20 (4) (1996): 136-175.
37
Elizabeth Pond, Endgame in the Balkans: Regime Change, European Style
(Washington DC: Brookings Institution, 2006), p. 151
38
On demographic homogenization and the reduction of chances for war, see Chaim
Kaufmann, “Intervention in Ethnic and Ideological Civil Wars: Why One Can be Done
and the Other Can't,” Security Studies, 1996: 62-100
39
With a population of 4.5 million, that comes down to one peacekeeper for every 75
citizens.
40
Pond, Endgame in the Balkans, p. 161.
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broad Serbian strategy. However, ethnic homogenization can also be the
result of local conflicts. In the absence of a functioning state, local power
brokers with a tribal, family, or even mafia base may create militias or
organizations (violent community organizations at the -2 level) that pursue
interests ranging from survival to enrichment and honor, and they react to
their neighbors doing likewise. In the process, one identity group may be
forced from the community, again resulting in homogenization.
U.S. forces, like any human organization, tend to assume that the
war is organized around their own activity.41 If the war is going badly,
then bad tactics or insufficient material support is to blame; if it’s going
well, then sound tactics and war-fighting prowess get the credit. Yet the
war can also have its own local logic, either working around or exploiting
U.S. forces as needed. Governments do not usually choose ethnic
homogenization as a strategy; it is normatively too close to ethnic
cleansing. Yet homogenization may help bring an end to violence.
Governments may turn a blind eye to the process (as some claim is
happening in Kirkuk), or they may work with the result of ethnic
cleansing, as happened in Bosnia, to maintain peace.
Community-Based Mobilization
Whereas homogenization as described above occurs without the
direct involvement of COIN forces,42 here government security forces ally
directly with +2 militias against -3 insurgents.43 While FM 3-24 stresses
the importance of regular engagement with local elites, their role is limited
Eliot Cohen, “Obama's COIN Toss,” Washington Post, 6 December 2009, points out
“the greatest weakness of the COIN literature: It often lacks deep knowledge of the other
side.” This is a problem in international relations broadly, known as “general attribution
error” or “perception of centralization” as discussed in Robert Jervis, Perception and
Misperception in International Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976),
319-342.
42
Assuming that government or COIN forces weren’t directly involved in the ethnic
cleansing, in which case the resultant homogenization would indeed be a case of tribal
mobilization.
43
The word “tribal” is used here in an Iraq context to call attention to a particularly
important form of level-2 group in that society.
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to the provision of intelligence and recruits for +3 security forces and the
bestowal of “legitimacy” to their efforts. Community-based mobilization
is theoretically distinct for two reasons. First, FM 3-24 characterizes
irregular units as threats because the use of violence outside of
government authority erodes legitimacy and thus helps insurgents: “If
militias are outside the [host nation] government’s control, they can often
be obstacles to ending an insurgency.”44 By contrast, here COIN forces
empower local militias to carry the fight to a common enemy (or at least
don’t stand in their way). Second, today’s +2 allies are often drawn from
yesterday’s -2 adversaries. The insurgency is not defeated outright or
simply delegitimized in the eyes of the population; rather, one or more of
its factions switch sides out of strategic interest.45
Transforming -2s to +2s aids the counterinsurgent’s campaign
against -3 adversaries, but not necessarily the overriding FM 3-24 goal of
building a strong, legitimate government. Local +2s are willful actors who
actively seek wealth, power, and/or honor; while they can be sources of
manpower and intelligence for +3 security forces, they only agree to pay
these taxes in order to bolster their own position. This stands in contrast
with the U.S.-centric view that COIN tactics alone—or any sort of
unidirectional agency—is sufficient to persuade a population. Influence
runs both ways, so +2s can also use the +3s to liquidate their rivals and
stabilize their revenue streams. This activity can be described as
corruption, but it is a normal part of survival in the absence of the
impersonal rule of law. COIN forces reinforce this personalized system
through the use of no-bid contracts to reward local elites for cooperation—
bribes, in essence, although “patronage” might be a politer term—because
they provide selective incentives for preventing +2s from becoming -2s.
Whereas FM 3-24 assumes that the solution to civil war anarchy is a
Weberian monopoly on violence invested in the state, the tribal
44

FM 3-24, 3-20
Paul Staniland, "Between a Rock and a Hard Place: Insurgent Fratricide, Ethnic
Defection, and the Rise of Pro-State Paramilitaries," Journal of Conflict Resolution
(forthcoming 2011)
45
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mobilization strategy gives rise to a stable truce among an oligopoly of
feudal warlords (or party bosses, mafia dons, tribal patriarchs, or whatever
the polite term might be).46 How and whether these can be consolidated
into the central state is a major research area in comparative politics, but
historically the process has been both lengthy and violent.47
Figure 3 illustrates how these different COIN “theories of victory”
target different parts of the spectrum of behavior:
A. Clear, hold, and build is the classic triangular COIN model focused
on protecting and persuading the population;
B. Decapitation is a two-way fight between militarized organizations,
emphasizing the systematic dismantling of clandestine networks by
SOF;
C. Homogenization is the termination of ethnic civil war, unrelated to
the efforts of government forces;
D. Tribal mobilization is an alliance between local power brokers and
COIN forces for mutual benefit.
The population plays an active role in (C) and (D) above in a
violent contest for feudal power consolidation. The counterinsurgent plays
an active role in (A), (B), and (D) in fighting, training, and development;
its absence in (C) underlines the fact that COIN forces are not masters of
46

Colin F. Jackson, "Fighting for Feudalism? Dilemmas of State Consolidation in Iraq
and Afghanistan," Paper presented at International Studies Association Annual
Convention, New York, February 2009. Jackson’s dissertation on COIN learning argues
that while militaries have an inherently hard time transitioning from a professional
“operational code” for conventional warfare to triangular COIN along the lines of FM 324, they hardly ever engage doctrinally with the feudal state-building dynamics of civil
war; Colin F. Jackson, Defeat in Victory: Organizational Learning Dysfunction in
Counterinsurgency, Ph.D. Dissertation, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2008.
47
Douglass C. North, John Joseph Wallis and Barry R. Weingast, Violence and Social
Orders: A Conceptual Framework for Interpreting Recorded Human History (Cambridge
University Press, 2009); Charles Tilly, Coercion, Capital and European States: AD 990 1992 (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 1992); Joseph R. Strayer, On the Medieval Origins of the
Modern State (Princeton University Press, 1973)
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their fate in a complex civil war. Economic development, which receives
such tremendous emphasis in COIN theory and practice, can serve
radically different functions: in (A) it softens popular grievances and
enhances government legitimacy; in (B) it enhances targeting intelligence
and avenues for assault against insurgents; in (D) it selectively bribes local
elites to collaborate. All four of these were in evidence in Iraq to some
degree, and while teasing them out empirically can be difficult, they are
conceptually different mechanisms for reducing violence in COIN.

Figure 3: Different COIN Strategies Address Different Segments of
the Population
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IV. Evaluation of the Implementation of
Counterinsurgency Strategy in Iraq

The preceding section laid out the logic of Clear, Hold, Build, the
foundation of FM 3-24, and alternative strategies. This section will return
to a regional analysis of the Iraqi insurgency. We return directly to the
central question of the study: how did the implementation of COIN
strategy and tactics, as outlined in the field manual, match up with
outcomes on the ground? Furthermore, what alternate explanations exist
for these outcomes?
We begin with an overview of aggregate statistics. Figure 4
provides an overview of the violence in Iraq together with the total
number of U.S. and international troops in the country. The primary axis
on the left measures the monthly level of significant activity (SIGACTS)
between February 2004 and December 2008, disaggregated by region. 48
Anbar and Baghdad are broken out separately because of their intrinsic
importance. The largely Sunni province of Ninewa has been broken out
from the Kurdish northern provinces (Tameem, Sulaymaniyah, Erbil, and
Dahuk). The South combines the four southernmost provinces (Basra,
Missan, Thi-Qar, and Muthanna), and Central is everything else
48

SIGACT data derived from Multi-National Forces Iraq SIGACT-III database as
reported by Eli Berman, Jacob N. Shapiro, and Joseph H. Felter, “Can Hearts and Minds
Be Bought? The Economics of Counterinsurgency in Iraq,” NBER Working Paper No.
14606, 2008. SIGACTS count a great number of different events ranging from direct and
indirect fire attacks on U.S. troops to IED finds (ambiguous whether finds measure foiled
attacks or informant cooperation), whether or not there are any casualties. They are
compiled from patrol, intelligence, and artillery counter-battery reports, and thus they
undercount Iraqi-on-Iraqi violence where U.S. troops are not present. There is some
difference in the shape of these curves compared to government reported data as
compiled in O’Hanlon and Livingston, “Iraq Index,” for example, which can be as a
result of counting different types of SIGACTS, aggregating on different timescales, or—
more worrisome—discrepancies between the classified SIGACT III database and filtered
data reported by Berman et al. But this is what we have and still usefully depicts the
broad trends.
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(significantly including Diyala and Salah-ad-Din, which drive most of the
SIGACTS in this category). See Map 1 on the provinces. The secondary
axis on the right measures the overall level of international troops
stationed in Iraq, with U.S. troops broken out separately.49

Figure 4: Regional Monthly SIGACTs (Primary Axis) and Overall
Troop Levels (Secondary Axis), Feb 2004 to Dec 2008
Descriptive statistics by themselves don’t explain anything, but
Figure 4 does suggest a few interpretations. First, it is easy to see how the
numbers roughly correspond with the surge and the introduction of FM 324. As troop levels rise in 2007, there is a dramatic decrease in SIGACTS
in the most violent regions during the same period. However, the broader
view over the several previous years shows that any simple correlation
between troop levels and SIGACTS is illusory. It is unlikely that an extra
30,000 troops would have kept the lid on the eruption of sectarian violence
in the central provinces and Baghdad in 2006 after AQI’s bombing of the
49

Troop data from O’Hanlon and Livingston, “Iraq Index,” 16
55

LINDSAY AND PETERSEN: VARIETIES OF INSURGENCY AND COUNTERINSURGENCY IN IRAQ, 20032009

Golden Mosque. While 2004 and 2005 appear to find some steady state of
violence, 2006 and 2007 are two to three times more severe.50
Second, it’s clear that Anbar is the first region to experience an
abrupt decrease in violence; this drop is plainly underway before the troop
surge momentum builds. Although troop levels are not broken out by
region, the surge concentrated on Baghdad anyway, with very little
increase in Anbar’s urban areas. As discussed further below, the turn of
Anbar’s tribes toward the Marines and against AQI began in late 2005 in
the Battle of al-Qaim, visible in the chart as a spike in SIGACTS, prior to
AQI’s instigation of sectarian civil war in 2006. JAM and the Badr
Brigades were of course eager to reciprocate in the killing once it started,
but it’s interesting that this did not happen until AQI experienced the
turning of the native Sunni tide in Anbar. Note that the rising SIGACTS in
Anbar in 2006 track not sectarian violence but the Battle of Ramadi
against U.S. forces. In Anbar and elsewhere, AQI violence was a
consequence and not a cause of the Awakening.
Third, SIGACTS rise in Ninewa—in and around Mosul in
particular—in 2007 and 2008, following the Anbar Awakening and during
the surge. This is significant in that it highlights the resilience of AQI, a
battle-hardened combat organization (-3), which simply picked up and
relocated its base of operations from Anbar to Ninewa during this time.
Fourth, SIGACTS in the south remain relatively low following a
few upticks in 2004 as the British combated Sadrist uprisings. However,
the situation steadily degrades through 2006 and 2007, which came as a
stark disappointment to premature pronouncements that the British,
drawing on experience in Northern Ireland, had implemented a softer and
more successful method of COIN than their knuckle-dragging cousins
across the ocean. It is likely that these measures do not adequately
describe the level of violence associated with the south for two reasons:
SIGACTS are measured by Western troops, which means the lighter
It’s unclear why violence in and around Baghdad appears to dip sharply and then
rebound in Autumn 2004, Winter 2005, and Spring 2007.
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British footprint in the South would have missed a lot of intra-Shia and
criminal violence; furthermore, Iraqi militias and their Iranian advisors
used the South as a logistics training and staging areas for sectarian attacks
carried out elsewhere in the Central region.
Lastly, violence levels in all regions do finally come down together
by the end of 2008. While not shown on this chart, levels remain at about
the same level into 2011. There is some cause for hope that Iraq’s “fragile
peace” is sustainable through ongoing changes in Iraqi government and
U.S. troop withdrawals. At the same time, it is sobering to note that Iraq’s
new normal—with mass murder attacks by AQI and other groups still
occurring on a regular basis—is comparable to the levels of violence in
2003 and early 2004 when the situation seemed to be unraveling. It is only
relative to the severe violence of 2006 and 2007 that the stable diminution
to present levels can be considered something like COIN success.
Another way to assess our central question is to pick up on the
previous regional analysis and extend it into the surge period. Doing so
shows how alternative counterinsurgency strategies provide explanations
to challenge the surge narrative. Indeed, this analysis will show multiple
strategies in operation across regions.We will examine Baghdad, Anbar,
and the Iraq South in turn. (On the whole, the Kurdish north was
effectively mobilized from the beginning, with interests that remained
durably aligned with the coalition in keeping Sunni and Shia insurgents at
bay. For the sake of parsimony, we will not cover those stable politics
here.) We also briefly discuss the strategy of decapitation.
On the eve of the invasion in 2003, Iraq was a land primed to
unleash many of the mechanisms that trigger and sustain insurgency. The
invasion and occupation would overturn a Sunni-dominated ethnic
hierarchy. Iraq’s numerous agents of repression in the secret police and
Baath Party militias would soon be released into an anarchic Iraqi society
awash with weapons. Significant remnants of tribal and ethnic social
norms mixed with elements of a modern repressive state. Religious
organizations, with their inherent focal points, would emerge from the
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breakdown of the state to focus action. This combination of forces would
provide complex social ties and multiple avenues for the mobilization of
violence when the state collapsed following the 2003 invasion.

Discussion Questions
1. How can COIN operations be evaluated? How do you know what
is causal and what is contributory?
2. Do changes in “contributory” inputs necessarily affect outcome?
3. How can we recognize potential problems or actions to be taken
before entry of military or COIN personnel?
4. How can lessons learned be applied in the future?

A. The Chaotic Capital Becomes Less Chaotic:
Clear/Hold/Build and/or Homogenization
The center of Iraq is dominated by its capital city of Baghdad,
which holds almost a quarter of the country’s population. The city
resembles many large cities in the U.S. in terms of variation among its
neighborhoods. For instance, Baghdad contains an ethnically homogenous
section of sprawling mass housing projects built in the 1950s—the Shia
neighborhood of Sadr City, with perhaps a million residents. But Baghdad
also sprouted richer neighborhoods such as Mansour, an ethnically mixed
area sometimes referred to as Baghdad’s Upper East Side. Other
neighborhoods fell along a spectrum of wealth-poverty, ethnic
homogeneity-heterogeneity. Often, the neighborhoods were separated by
natural boundaries, such as the Tigris River, or manmade ones, such as
highways or parks. All of them would come under violent pressures in the
wake of the occupation, although, as this section will illustrate, these
forces would play out very differently across neighborhoods.
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Troubles began soon after the arrival of US forces in 2003. With
the disappearance of police and order, thousands of looters descended on
17 of 23 government ministries. Then they turned on schools and
hospitals. Looters first sought out computers and air conditioners, but the
extent of looting spread to include even cooper wiring.51 After the
establishment of order (helped by the fact that there was little left to loot),
Baghdad experienced a period of relative calm. Two events in May,
however, set the stage for the violent conflict that followed. First, Paul
Bremer, as head of the CPA, proclaimed the de-Baathification of Iraqi
society as CPA Order Number 1; CPA Order Number 2 disbanded the
Iraqi Army, putting 350,000 men in the street without a salary. Second, on
May 19, Muslim cleric Muqtada al-Sadr led thousands of Shia through
Baghdad in a protest of the American occupation. The event was a
precursor of things to come. On July 18, Muqtada al-Sadr announced
plans to form an “Islamic Army” to challenge the occupation.
Religious figures soon became central actors and mosques became
focal points in Baghdad just as in other regions of Iraq. As an International
Crisis Group report would later summarize:
For a variety of reasons, mosques have become the focal point of
political mobilization. Once the Baathist regime was removed
and its institutions disbanded or discredited, no other viable
centre of mobilisation survived. For Shiite parties that returned
from exile—SCIRI and Daawa in particular—and those that
emerged from the shadows inside the country—such as Muqtada
Sadr’s movement—religious identity was the prime organizing
principle of politics. They seized upon the mosque, an institution
untainted by the past, as their main vehicle for assembly,
propagation and recruitment. ... Sunni and Shiite mosques alike
Keegan, p. 206. Also see “Baghdad: A Race Against the Clock,” International Crisis
Group, Middle East Briefing No. 6, June 11, 2003. For a critique of the Bush
Administrations early efforts, see David Rieff, “Blueprint for a Mess,” New York Times,
November 2, 2003.
51
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became staging grounds for political marches and
demonstrations, and Friday sermons began to be used as channels
of political communication.52
While much of the Baghdad population met the invasion with
passive support (+1) or neutrality (0), the stage was set for several
mechanisms to move significant parts of the population to the left side of
the spectrum, that is, to resistance.
The population might have supported the government if it could
have met expectations for safety. However, violence was already rocking
Baghdad by the late summer and fall of 2003. On August 7, a car bomb
killed 15 at the Jordanian Embassy; on August 19, a truck bomb killed 24
and injured over 100 at U.N. Headquarters; on October 9, 12, 14, and 27,
suicide attackers hit a variety of targets—police stations, the Turkish
Embassy, the Islamic Red Cross, the Baghdad Hotel. Religious events not
only provide focal points for mobilization, they also provide symbolic
targets for strategies aimed at setting off the emotion of anger and violent
spirals. On March 2, 2004, Shia observed the Ashura ceremony in
Baghdad and Karbala for the first time since the Baathists took power.
They were met with a wave of bombs that killed at least 270 and wounded
573.
By early 2005, the violence was taking on sectarian overtones in
Baghdad. After the Second Battle of Fallujah, many Sunni refugees fled
that leveled city to move to predominately Sunni neighborhoods in the
western part of Baghdad. These Sunni refugees then came into contact
with a police and government now dominated by Shia. Attacks on the
police and government accordingly took on an ethnic meaning, with
Sunnis pitted against “collaborating” Shia. Soon, in a process first
observed in the al Amriya neighborhood, Sunnis began targeting Shia just

International Crisis Group, “The Next Iraqi War? Sectarianism and Civil Conflict,”
Middle East Report, no. 52, February 27, 2006.
52
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for being Shia.53 Shia families began to find threatening letters identifying
them as collaborators, as seen in this example:
In the name of God, do not think that God is unaware of what the
oppressors are doing. We are watching your movements step by
step, and we know that you have betrayed God and his
messenger; for that we give you 48 hours to leave Amriya
forever, and you should thank God that you are still alive. And
there will be no excuse after this warning.54
In other predominately Sunni neighborhoods, such as Dora, letters
and threats turned into violence. Soon, Shia began to retaliate in kind
against local Sunni minorities. The violence became more organized, more
clearly sectarian, and more brutal. Militias, with their own death squads,
formed in several neighborhoods (-2). Building on local network ties,
individuals took advantage of the chaos to establish themselves as leaders
of neighborhood organizations.55 The population, caught in between, was
forced to side with a militia able to offer protection or to flee to a
neighborhood dominated by their co-ethnics. Spiraling violence soon led
to homogenized or homogenizing neighborhoods. At the end of 2006, the
U.S. military created a new map of Baghdad, one that reflected the new

Nir Rosen, “Anatomy of a Civil War: Iraq’s Descent into Chaos,” Boston Review
(November/December 2006).
54
Quoted in Rosen, “Anatomy of a Civil War.”
55
The International Crisis Group, in a report based on the words of insurgents
themselves, summarized early resistance dynamics: “Elements of the former regime,
some Shiites included, soon helped set up small cells of fighters. But this was not planned
ahead of time and reflected neither a desire to restore the past nor ideological attachment
to Baathism; rather, these cells developed gradually, initially drawing individuals angered
by dim prospects and resentful of the occupation and its indignities, and building on preexisting party, professional, tribal, familial, or geographic—including neighborhood—
networks.” International Crisis Group, “In Their Own Words: Reading the Iraqi
Insurgency,” Middle East Report No. 50, February 15, 2006.
53
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sectarian reality of the city (see Map 1).56 Almost every neighborhood
could tell a story of one side cleansing the other—in Amriya, the Sunnis
pushed out the Shia; in Dora, Sunnis attacked Shia but then Shia members
of the Mahdi Army counterattacked and purged the Sunni; in Adhamiya,
Sunnis maintained an ethnic island within Shia east Baghdad; in ShaabUr, Shia established complete dominance; Shia Badr Brigades controlled
sections of Karada.57

Map 1: The Ethnic Homogenization of Baghdad

Map 3 is taken from Ned Parker and Ali Hamdani, “How Violence is Forging a Brutal
Divide in Baghdad, Times of London, December 14, 2006.
57
The New York Times summarized the dynamics of Baghdad neighborhoods in a special
report published on December 15, 2010
56
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The analytical framework captures much, but not all, of the early
evolution of insurgency in Baghdad. Sunni resentment first fueled antigovernment violence. These Sunni attacks on a new predominately Shia
government and police force stoked sectarian tensions and led to violent
spirals. Some individuals, building on community connections, created
local militia cells outside the control of the government (-2). Caught in the
middle of escalating violence, individuals could not remain neutral. In
effect, individuals were forced to calculate in terms of “safety in
numbers.” They either had to join the local militia (moving to -2), become
part of the support network of local militias (moving to -1), or move into
ethnically homogenous neighborhoods protected by militias. The
analytical framework does not pick up one central phenomenon though.
The spectrum roles spread from government support to insurgent support.
In this case, the government was hard to find. Movement occurred
between poles defined by insurgent groups.
As the numbers of SIGACTS indicates, Baghdad saw dramatic
changes over the course of a few short years. In December 2005, the
number of SIGACTS totaled just 500. By January 2007 this number
skyrocketed to 3500, a sevenfold increase. The figure then plummeted as
dramatically as it rose, returning to a level of approximately 600
SIGACTS in February 2008. The surge deployment began in January
2007 and reached its peak in June of the same year. The question is
whether the surge and the implementation of FM 3-24 and clear/hold/build
are responsible for the observed decline.
Several military officers have written their own neighborhood case
studies of the implementation of the new COIN strategy during this
period. These narratives illustrate in detail the application of the
clear/hold/build strategy. Major Thomas Sills describes the tactics used in
the East Rashid area of Baghdad, including the Sunni Dora neighborhood,
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which contained a significant AQI presence.58 The First Cavalry Division
arrived in November 2006 and quickly began “clear” operations. They
conducted cordon and search operations focusing on three neighborhoods.
By June of 2007, U.S. forces had established a 24/7 presence able to
monitor movement and reduce the ability to plant IEDs. In Operation
Close Encounter, soldiers, protected by rooftop surveillance, visited every
home on certain blocks. If all residents are visited, insurgents cannot
single out specific informants. At each home, soldiers took pictures and
gathered resident information.
After a constant military presence had been established, “hold”
operations began. U.S. forces erected a series of concrete barriers to help
funnel movement into a system of checkpoints where documents could be
systematically examined. Current residents were queried about new
arrivals in the neighborhood. Enhanced security then propelled “build”
operations. U.S. forces first concentrated on visible public works projects,
including sewage clearage and trash removal. The US forces employed
locals to fix the streetlight system and build soccer fields. Nearly a halfmillion dollars of micro-grant funding found its way into local hands. By
November of 2007, US forces began hiring local members of the Sons of
Iraq as security guards with the intention of some eventual integration
with the local police.
Major Sills’s description illustrates clear/hold/build in practice. As
in theory, the strategy aimed at converting individuals at the -1 level to the
+1 level through heightened security and visible public works projects.
The newly sympathetic population then becomes more willing to provide
information to hunt down the now delegitimized -3 elements lurking in the
community. As Major Sills states, “The enemy’s greatest strength seemed
to be the ability to blend into the community without being recognized as

The following paragraphs are based on Thomas J. Sills, “Counterinsurgency
Operations in Baghdad: The Actions of 1-4 Cavalry in the East Rashid Security District,”
Military Review, May-June 2009, pp. 97-105.
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part of the insurgency by coalition forces.”59 With the information gleaned
from local residents, US forces were able to identify and capture 250 of
these formerly hidden AQI targets, with 81% sent to Camp Cropper.
Despite these narratives, there is still reason to question whether
the application of clear/hold/build produced the dramatic fall in SIGACTS
seen above. While the surge correlates with these numbers, it also occurs
directly after the ethnic homogenization of Baghdad. Recall Map 1. The
neighborhoods in Baghdad were radically homogenizing during 2006.
Logically, one could imagine a three-step process during the ethnic
unmixing of any neighborhood. In the first stage, at the very beginning of
violent conflict, the number of SIGACTS would be low. As violence
begins to spiral, the number of SIGACTS would increase at a very fast
rate. The highest number of incidents of violence might occur when one
side (call it X) has gained an advantage over another side (call it Y). If the
ratio of X:Y is at 50: 50, then a rough balance of power may act as a
deterrent. However, if through ethnic flight, the ratio changes to 75: 25,
then X gains some offensive advantage while the numbers of Y still
provide ample targets. If ethnic flight continues and the ratio falls to 95: 5,
then X can act with impunity, but the number of targets has fallen to a
level where we would not expect to see a high number of violent acts.
After complete homogenization, the level of SIGACTS would be expected
to become very low, especially if the boundaries between the separated
populations were firm.
This story would seem to fit the Baghdad numbers. Spiraling
sectarian violence began homogenizing the population during 2006,
especially after the Samarra bombing in February. In the days following
the bombing of the Shia Askari shrine, over 1,300 bodies, mostly Sunni,
were found in Baghdad. By the time the surge and the new strategy were
being fully implemented, the spiral of violence was near its peak. The
level of ethnic heterogeneity may have been at the right proportions to
produce high violence. The surge continued while the process of
59

Sills, pp. 98-99.
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homogenization played out and the numbers of victims declined. As the
US forces constructed concrete barriers around Baghdad, they may have
only been “cementing” the results of the homogenization process.

B. The Sunni West, Anbar Province, and the Role of
Tribal Mobilization
Anbar province sprawls from the western suburbs of Baghdad to
the Jordanian and Syrian borders. Its population of 1.4 million is almost
exclusively Sunni Arab, in contrast with Iraq’s religious and ethnic
diversity elsewhere. The provincial capital Ramadi anchored the western
corner of the restive “Sunni triangle,” which stretched from Baghdad to
Saddam’s hometown of Tikrit. The Anbari population was solidly -1 in
2003 because it had suffered a major status reversal with the defeat of
Saddam and rise of “Persian usurpers” in his place (as Sunnis often
referred to Shia in power). American patrols inadvertently reinforced this
resentment with indiscriminate arrests of military-aged males and
humiliating treatment of Iraqis in their homes. Many displaced Baath
Party members, demobilized Republican Guard soldiers, and intelligence
service elites made their way back into this disgruntled and resentful
population, becoming seeds for movement to -2. Furthermore, the Iraqi
Army had dissolved rather than surrendered, former soldiers taking their
weapons with them and raiding supply depots, so Anbar was awash in
weapons. Former regime elements provided a ready supply of resentful
Sunni fighters at the -2 (local organized fighters) and -3 (mobile
organized) levels. The province was primed to become the locus of
nationalist rebellion against American occupation.60
60

COIN in Anbar is better documented than any other province not only because it was
the violent heart of the insurgency for so long as well as the home of the dramatic
Awakening, but also because the Marine Corps was the battlespace owner for most of the
war. The Army, institutionally, took a national rather than a provincial view of Iraq
because it had to divide its intelligence and staff support across all provinces and tended
to send soldiers to different locations for each deployment. The Marines, by contrast, put
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Anbar’s populated areas are almost all along the Western
Euphrates River Valley (WERV), a longstanding historical corridor for
licit and illicit trade between the Levant and Baghdad. After the invasion it
became a major channel for foreign fighters and weapons fueling the
insurgencies. Control of lucrative smuggling traditionally rested with the
Bedouin tribes along the WERV, which have retained a distinct form of
organization around traditional patriarchs, family clans, and codes of tribal
justice. With the fall of Baghdad, former regime element loyalties reverted
to their tribal affiliation. Wherever the state grows weaker, tribal influence
over local social and economic affairs grows stronger, as reflected in time
with the weakening of the Baath regime during years of war and sanctions,
and in space with distance from the formal authority of provincial and
national capitals.61
In 2003 the tribes were thus quite influential on the Syrian border,
a lucrative point of control for WERV smuggling. However, as foreign
Arabs began pouring in to wage jihad against Americans, they also began
to contest control of the WERV to fund their operations. Competition over
the WERV black market would eventually provide the wedge between
Anbari tribesmen and insurgents like AQI. Tribal clans with strong local
social and economic interests were the basic organizing principle for
down roots and developed relationships across successive rotations. The Marine Corps
Intelligence Activity (MCIA) in particular provided useful intellectual contributions and
continuity to the Marines’ understanding of the sociopolitical dynamics of the province.
The Marines’ invaluable official history is notable amid the largely U.S.-centric literature
on COIN and the war for giving equal weight to the perspective of Iraqi protagonists; see
Timothy S. McWilliams and Kurtis P. Wheeler, Al-Anbar Awakening: U.S. Marines and
Counterinsurgency in Iraq 2004-2009, Volume I, American Perspectives (Quantico, VA:
Marine Corps University Press, 2009); Montgomery and McWilliams, Anbar Awakening,
Vol. II.
61
Hosham Dawood, “The Stateization of the Tribe and the Tribalization of the State: The
Case of Iraq,” in Tribes and Power: Nationalism and Ethnicity in the Middle East, ed.
Faleh Jabar and Hosham Dawood (London: Saqi Books, 2003); Amatzia Baram, "NeoTribalism in Iraq: Saddam Husayn's Tribal Policies 1991-1996," Journal of Middle
Eastern Studies vol. 29, no. 1 (1997): 29-56; Lin Todd, Iraq Tribal Study–al-Anbar
Governorate: The Albu Fahd Tribe, the Albu Mahal Tribe and the Albu Issa Tribe,
Global Resources Group, Department of Defense, 2006
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organized +2 and -2 activity. Urban Baathists and rural tribesmen rebelled
against the occupation to defend national and tribal honor. The
organization known as the 1920 Revolutionary Brigades, named in
commemoration of resistance against British colonialism, was the most
notable -3 manifestation of this set of identities.
Nationalists were soon joined by religious extremists. Religious
and nationalist identities reinforced one another as clerics and former
regime elements fomented resentment against the occupation. Fallujah in
particular, “the city of mosques” located between Ramadi and Baghdad
with a conservative Sunni population, generated considerable indigenous
religious fervor for insurgency—exemplified in organizations like Ansar
al-Sunnah—and the city also became a magnet for foreign Sunni
extremists. Predominantly from Saudi Arabia, these foreigners were not
initially affiliated with Osama bin Laden’s al Qaeda. An entrepreneurial
Jordanian terrorist named Abu Musab al-Zarqawi declared his alliance to
al Qaeda in October 2004 and renamed his group “al Qaeda between the
two rivers” or AQI. AQI would prove to be a robust combat organization
(-3), with formal bureaucratic processes governing its manpower and
operations; thus it had the capacity to plan complex operations, quickly
replace slain leaders, and administer its finances and logistics across
national and operating area boundaries.62
The First Battle of Fallujah was sparked by the killing of four
Blackwater private contractors on March 31, 2004. The bodies were set on
fire and two were hung from a bridge, a potent symbolic focal point for
the angry crowds. The Marines launched an offensive to take the city but
halted when members of the Iraqi Governing Council threatened to resign.
The Second Battle resumed in November after the ceasefire collapsed and
the Iraqi unit in charge of securing Fallujah dissolved and abandoned its
weapons to the insurgents. The Marines prevailed in intense urban combat
62

Benjamin Bahney, Howard J. Shatz, Carroll Ganier, Renny Mcpherson, Barbara Sude,
Sara Beth Elson and Ghassan Schbley, An Economic Analysis of the Financial Records of
Al-Qa'Ida in Iraq (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2010)
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against insurgents who had poured in throughout the summer and fall to
prepare fighting positions.63 The battles of Fallujah highlighted the fact
that religious insurgents had managed to upstage regime loyalists as the
deadliest threat. Angry Anbaris boycotted the national and provincial
elections in January 2005; with voter turnout less than 2%, the Baathbanned and newly active Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP) won most of the
positions in the province, but it never managed to achieve popular
legitimacy throughout the next several years (whether because of stealing
the election or just being the incumbent during some hard years is an open
question). Marine attempts to cultivate working relationships with tribal
leaders during 2005 were largely abortive. Meanwhile, AQI’s influence
and violence in the province grew.64
Starting on the Syrian border in late 2005 and intensifying in
Ramadi through 2006, Sunni tribesmen began to work with U.S. forces to
combat a common AQI enemy. The tribes (initially -2) had welcomed in
foreign fighters and Iraqi religious extremists to aid in their nationalist
rebellion against the occupation, but this alliance of convenience frayed as
AQI began to assert control over the lucrative Euphrates smuggling
networks that the tribes traditionally controlled. The tribes (level -2 but not
yet pro-American) proved no match for the combat-organized AQI (-3) on
their own. Early U.S. attempts to cultivate tribal alliances, such as the
2005 Anbar People’s Council, failed as AQI retaliated with a fierce
murder and intimidation campaign against tribal elites. After
unsuccessfully trying to take on AQI, Albu Mahal tribesmen on the Syrian
border eventually turned to U.S. Marines for assistance. Cooperation
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Bing West, No True Glory: A Frontline Account of the Battle For Fallujah (Bantam,
2005)
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For an excellent—and pessimistic—contemporary analysis of the increasing influence
of, popular sympathy for, and self-funding by the Sunni insurgencies in and around
Anbar, see Michael Eisenstadt and Jeffrey White, "Assessing Iraq's Sunni Arab
Insurgency," Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Policy Focus #50, December
2005. See also Bruce R. Pirnie and Edward O'Connell, Counterinsurgency in Iraq (20032006) (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2008),
http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2008/RAND_MG595.3.pdf.
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between the Marines and Iraqi Army combat power (+3) and a tribal
militia called the Desert Protectors (+2) during Operation Steel Curtain led
to the first solid setbacks for AQI in and around the border town of alQaim.65 Two important points stand out: first, alliances were abortive
until influential tribesmen decided to make them; second, AQI violence
was a consequence, not a cause of this turn.66
By 2006 similar tribal alliances with American forces were
forming in Ramadi. The well-known Anbar Awakening (Sahawa alAnbar) movement emerged under the leadership of Sheikh Sittar alRishawi, a smuggler from a relatively minor tribe; Sittar rose to
prominence after AQI killed his father and two brothers and he remained
in Anbar while more senior sheikhs fled to Jordan and Syria. Alliances
formed haphazardly through negotiations on the initiative of local tribal
elite, junior- and mid-grade Army and Marine officers, and the CIA.67
U.S. combat power (+3) or Anbari tribal militias (+2) alone had been
unable to turn back AQI’s ferocity because Americans could not find the
enemy, while the tribe could not withstand AQI’s retribution. Yet by
working together, the tribes were able to provide local intelligence and
mobilize manpower for municipal police and self-defense forces, which
enabled regular combat forces to decimate AQI throughout its strongholds
along the Euphrates. U.S. military learning proceeded through trial and
error in the absence of standardized COIN doctrine, with significant
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bottom-up innovation, especially in the field of information gathering and
management.68
Violence spiked in late 2006 as AQI stepped up its campaign of
intimidation and beheadings against tribal collaborators, and newly
emboldened militias started executing suspected AQI members with
greater frequency. The climax of the war in Anbar was the battle to secure
Ramadi, which was notable for tribal vigilantism, local self-defense
groups, significant physical controls on movement (such as sand berms
around cities, concrete barriers partitioning neighborhoods, checkpoints,
and mandatory identification cards), and U.S. combat outposts situated
right in the middle of urban neighborhoods. American personnel—both
SOF and conventional forces—engaged and reassured local Anbari civic
and tribal leaders, helping to organize neighborhood defense organizations
and rewarding collaborators with lucrative construction contracts. Popular
sympathy shifted sharply against AQI even in the face of fierce
retribution.69 In early 2007, AQI remnants were forced to shift northward
to Mosul, and violence in Anbar dropped precipitously. The pacification
of Anbar predated the Petraeus surge.70
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Events in Anbar inspired irregular militias outside of Anbar to take
the fight to insurgents in other parts of the country, contributing to a
similar diminution in violence nationwide. As violence subsided in 2007,
U.S. forces renewed their emphasis on building government capacity,
worked to demobilize militias and integrate them into police and security
forces, and encouraged tribal elite to participate in legitimate politics.
While this did not resolve the deep rift between the Sunni province and the
Shia-dominated central government, the emergence of stability and its
endurance up through the time of this writing was nonetheless remarkable.
It’s worth noting, furthermore, that with the fading of Baathist or extremist
hopes for regaining power, little was left to fight about in oil-free,
ethnically homogenous, out-of-the-way Anbar. Combating insurgency
gave way to political competition in Anbar, and the province transitioned
peacefully to Iraqi control in August 2008. RAND conducted surveys in
2008 and 2009 and found that Anbaris reported rising standards of living
and perception of safety; remarkably, “most now say they would turn to
their local police, rather than other community-level actors, such as tribes
and local leaders, to deal with crime effectively.”71
Anbar by 2009 was coming close to realizing the FM 3-24 goal of
strengthened public institutions and enhanced government legitimacy, but
the path to get there was not necessarily the one charted by FM 3-24.
Rather, that path was better described by tribal mobilization. FM 3-24
views the population as passive “human terrain” that can yield
intelligence, security force recruits, and sympathy if properly cultivated. In
practice, COIN forces in Anbar and elsewhere encountered a diverse array
of actors pursuing their own interests and agendas. Typical battalion-level
in Anbar?" Military Review (September-October 2009). Book-length treatments of the
heroic version of the Awakening include: Bing West, The Strongest Tribe: War, Politics,
and the Endgame in Iraq (New York: Random House, 2008); Dick Couch, The Sheriff of
Ramadi: Navy SEALs and the Winning of Anbar (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press,
2008).
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after-action reports described chaotic violence upon arrival, followed by a
period of developing new tactics and work practices, building
relationships with the local elite and building public works projects,
intelligence to catch some real bad guys finally, and through it all, a
gradual diminution of violence. The improvement often did not last, which
gave later relief battalions the chance to write the same sort of reports.
These accounts, although written in the argot of FM 3-24, suggest that
some individual American warlords—the battalion commanders—
managed to reach accommodations to bolster local powerbrokers through
the use of selective development projects as incentives and credible
commitments to keep to the deals negotiated. But their stability was
always very sensitive to the local microbalance of power, which might be
changed simply with the rotation in of a new fresh and ignorant unit, to
say nothing of the larger constellation of political and insurgent
movements.
Where the incentives of powerful +2s durably aligned with the
Americans, the effects could be dramatic. Violence could be abated, but at
the cost of a weakening of the central government. As one Anbari sheikh
put it, “If we had a modern state, we wouldn't have to rely on the rule of
tribes, [but until then] a little bit of evil is better than more.”72 In Anbar,
not until the tribes and the religious extremists broke over control of the
provincial black market in late 2005 was there an alignment of interests.
Anbar Awakening leader Sittar al-Rishawi wryly noted that, “Our
American friends had not understood us when they came. They were
proud, stubborn people and so were we. They worked with the
opportunists, now they have turned to the tribes, and this is as it should
be.”73 Prior to this marriage of convenience, negotiated progress was
fragile and weak allies vulnerable to assassination. After this, a wave of
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Awakenings and Sons of Iraq movements scrambled to make use of
American power before it left for good.
Tribal mobilization in Iraq was frustrating because COIN forces
were not the masters of their fate. One troubling irony of Anbar, the
paradigm case of tribal mobilization, is that the U.S. seems to have needed
to lose before it could win. The alliance between Sunni tribes and Islamic
extremists that sustained rebellion against continuous American tactical
victories split up on the eve of victory over a feud for control of lucrative
smuggling; the tribes then recruited the considerable combat power of the
political loser to vanquish its new rival. They also never took their eye off
gathering Shia power in the central state and needed to consolidate their
hold on the province. The tribes had work for U.S. forces to do before they
left Anbar, once it was clear that they were in fact going to leave.

C. The South: Overwhelming Complexity
Iraq’s southern provinces—especially Basra—are distinguished by
their predominantly Shia population and their rich oil fields situated on
Iraq’s only Gulf access. The Baath regime repressed the former and
exploited the latter. The region suffered some of the heaviest fighting
during the Iran-Iraq war in the 1980s, which provided Iran with experience
supporting irregular Shia partisans deep within Iraqi territory and which
forced many Shia to flee the country. The Shia population suffered further
in the wake of the abortive 1991 uprising following the First Gulf War.
Saddam heavily garrisoned the region and drained the marshes in the
Euphrates-Tigris delta in order to deny cover to rebels and bandits; this
also wrecked the rural agricultural and smuggling economy. Like the
Sunni tribes in Anbar’s WERV, Shia tribes in the marshes traditionally
made their living through illicit trading and resistance to municipal rule.
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Unlike resource-poor Anbar, Basra’s oil fields and Gulf ports also made it
the country’s economic prize.74
Coalition forces fought the Battle of Basra in the early days of the
invasion and then focused on hunting down Baath elite rather than
policing the heavy looting. British troops garrisoned in the “deep south”
faced a crisis of rising expectations among the liberated but destitute Shia,
marked by increasingly violent demonstrations and rampant criminality.
Rory Stewart, the British governance coordinator in Maysan province,
noted that the fractured tribes “relied on theft, kidnapping, smuggling and
looting” to maintain their relevance and could not be counted on to
mobilize manpower or other support for the government.75 Resuscitation
of the oil industry to fund reconstruction and the lifting of sanctions on all
sorts of consumer goods was a major boon to smuggling rackets. The
anarchic competition among fractured criminal and tribal networks (level
2s) proved an inscrutable and unreliable base upon which to rebuild the
prior predictability of Baath and Iraqi Army rule. Instability and
disappointment with the ongoing occupation shifted the population to -1,
while attempts to tamp down on criminality had the effect of switching
any +2 segments of the population that depended on it firmly to -2.
To this vicious spiral of anti-Coalition rebellion was overlaid a
class-based schism in the Shia Islamist community. The split originally
emerged after the Iranian revolution and the Baathist execution of one of
two senior Shia clerics in Iraq, Ayatollah Muhammad Baqr al-Sadr. The
other, Ayatollah Baqr al-Hakim, took refuge in Iran and founded the
Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI). SCIRI had a
militant wing known as the Badr Brigades that conducted cross-border
operations as an Iranian proxy throughout the war. Sadr’s nephew,
Ayatollah Sadiq al-Sadr (Sadr II), remained in Iraq to lead a more
74
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nationalist and radical Islamist faction until Saddam executed him and his
two eldest sons in order to consolidate Baath grip in the wake of the U.S.
Operation Desert Fox raids in 1998. Sadr II’s followers carried on through
the Office of the Martyr Sadr (OMS), finding a receptive audience with
the young urban poor throughout southern Iraq. Sadr II’s fourth son,
Muqtada al-Sadr, seized leadership of OMS after the invasion and, with a
militant wing known as the Mahdi Army (JAM), attempted to wrest
control of Shia holy sites in Iraq and the slums of eastern Baghdad (which
were renamed Sadr City).76
The Islamist confrontation between the populist OMS and the
returned émigré SCIRI, with their respective militias JAM and Badr,
interpenetrated the criminal/tribal mafias and ruined moderate political
competition. OMS developed an alternative legislature and provided
public welfare services, sharia courts, and jobs in the JAM for the large
numbers of unemployed Shia men. SCIRI and Badr had returned with
financial and logistic support from Iran and won the support of educated
middle-class Shia who feared the rise of the Sadrist mob. A more
disciplined organization, SCIRI targeted leadership positions in Baghdad
and the southern provinces and became more palatable to Coalition forces
in doing so. Badr infiltrated Iraqi police and intelligence units and
undertook their own illegal de-Baathification programs against both Sunni
and Shia, foreshadowing the sectarian conflict to come. Thus while both
OMS and SCIRI scrambled for power in anticipation of the CPA handing
over power to Iraqis, it was the populist OMS and JAM that came into
violent conflict with Coalition forces more often. British operations
managed to suppress several Sadrist uprisings in advance of the 2005
elections, but the Islamist takeover of the south proceeded apace. Sunni
Arabs and moderate or secular intellectuals were most at risk in the
poisonous mix of extreme factionalism. The web of violent political
competition among local militias (-2s) became ever more complicated as
Knights and Williams, " Calm Before the Storm,” 2-4; Vali Nasr, The Shia Revival:
How Conflicts Within Islam Will Shape the Future (New York, NY: W. W. Norton, 2006)
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new Sadrist factions emerged, electoral coalitions formed and dissolved,
and oil rackets remained extremely lucrative for feuding mafias.77 As an
Iraqi civil servant in Basra put it, “Today, the police fear the citizen, not
the other way around. They are afraid he may belong to a powerful
party.”78
The final complicating factor for Coalition forces in the south was
Iranian influence. U.S. intelligence estimated that as many as 150
members of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards paramilitary Qods Force
(+3) were operating in Iraq, providing training and material assistance. 79
Munitions with Iranian markings, newly constructed 240mm rockets, and
deadly explosively formed penetrator (EFP) mines began appearing with
increasing frequency from 2004 onward. EFPs were effective even against
heavy armor, so while they were used in less than 10% of roadside attacks,
they caused 40% of the casualties.80 While Iranian ties with Badr were
historically strongest, Qods also facilitated JAM special groups in their
attacks against Western troops, even as Badr and JAM fought one another.
Persian influence should not be overstated in the intensely nationalist
political struggle for southern Iraq, but Iran did play an important spoiler
role by bleeding Coalition forces and complicating their understanding of
local dynamics.
Absolute levels of violence in southern Iraq never approached the
horrifying levels elsewhere; nevertheless, the complex situation there
revealed the limits of all of the varieties of COIN. To sum up the situation
in Basra, Coalition forces and their unreliable and infiltrated Iraqi partners
(+3) were caught in the middle of a complex tussle between various tribal,
political, and criminal militias (-2) who used violence as a routine tool in
Knights and Williams, "The Calm Before the Storm”; International Crisis Group,
"Where is Iraq Heading? Lessons from Basra," Middle East Report #67, 25 June 2007
78
International Crisis Group, "Where is Iraq Heading,” 15
79
Mark Urban, Task Force Black: The Explosive True Story of the SAS and the Secret
War in Iraq (London: Little, Brown, 2010), 206-7
80
Michael Knights, "Iran's Ongoing Proxy War in Iraq," Washington Institute For Near
East Policy, Policy Focus #1492, 16 March 2009.
77

77

LINDSAY AND PETERSEN: VARIETIES OF INSURGENCY AND COUNTERINSURGENCY IN IRAQ, 20032009

their struggle for local power. As none of them were able to dominate the
others, the counterinsurgents found no capable tribal partners to help
assert a durable stability, and the situation remained inscrutable.
Development projects intended to win the hearts and minds of a frustrated
and disappointed population (-1) disappeared into corrupt pockets, and so
the population looked to the party militias (-2) for protection. Iranian
paramilitaries (-3) provided material support to any who would attack the
British and encouraged liquidation of Sunni and secular threats. JSOC did
initiate a Counter Iranian Influence campaign to attempt to disrupt this
support network, but target approval was hampered by protection provided
by Shia elite in Baghdad and U.S. reticence to publicly antagonize Iran. 81
In any case, the conflict between SOF (+3) and Qods and JAM’s special
groups (-3) was carried on simultaneously and with a separate logic from
(i.e., orthogonal to) the level-2 power struggles in and around Basra.
What stability did exist was a result of the balance of power among
militias, not COIN. While the parties—OMS and SCIRI—became vital in
the emerging political organization of the south and interacted regularly
with the Coalition, both flouted the rule of law. Ironically, Coalition
attempts to recruit members for legitimate police forces only increased
their penetration by JAM and Badr. Even worse, local actors could and did
fleece COIN forces for resources and exploit them to liquidate rivals. The
International Crisis Group noted in June 2007 that “[s]ecurity forces act at
best as bystanders, at worst as one or another side’s accomplice. Informal,
unofficial mechanisms also are used to regulate violence … extrainstitutional forums have become privileged arenas of conflict resolution,
further undermining official institutions, most notably the judiciary.”82
The British set out to tackle police corruption prior to their drawdown with
Operation Sinbad, which was to implement “clear, hold, and civil
reconstruction,” much along the lines of the Baghdad Security Plan.
Sinbad’s recruitment drives, neighborhood sweeps, and community
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projects produced a temporary improvement within the urban center of
Basra, but the area outside remained tied up with illegal checkpoints and
feuding gangs. Furthermore, once the British retreated to their compounds
in mid-2007 and formally handed over control of the province to the Iraqis
on December, the city itself also relapsed into militia control.83 A senior
U.S. intelligence official said, "The British have basically been defeated in
the south.”84
Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki surprised U.S. commanders in
March 2008 with an ambitious plan called Operation Charge of the
Knights to send two Iraqi Army brigades to pacify Basra with little
advance notice. The Americans scrambled to provide backup support,
SOF, and close-air support as the Iraqis ran into stiff resistance from JAM
and suffered desertions by over 1,000 personnel. The heavy fighting died
down on March 30 with a negotiated ceasefire between Sadr’s OMS,
SCIRI’s Badr Organization, and Maliki’s Dawa party, brokered by,
curiously enough, the head of IRGC Qods Force in Iran. Throughout April
and May, reinforced Iraqi units with American support moved to
deliberately clear militants and weapons caches from Basra
neighborhoods, and then followed up by dispensing humanitarian aid,
garrisoning forces, recruiting police, and launching reconstruction
projects.85
Charge of the Knights enjoyed sufficient manpower and the will of
Maliki’s government to follow through, unlike the earlier British-led
Operation Sinbad. Despite the early stumbles, this looks like a successful
instance of “clear, hold, build,” although contemporary observers were
quick to add caveats that security gains in Basra were fragile and
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reversible and that the militia and criminal networks were still alive and
well underground. Charge of the Knights was a political victory for
Maliki. It sent a message to Sunnis—awakened but still suspicious of the
Baghdad government—that Maliki was willing to use the predominantly
Shia Iraqi Army (+3) to crack down on Shia militias (+2) as well as Sunni
insurgents (-2); also, it shored up worries about Maliki’s resolve within the
Dawa- and SCIRI-dominated Shia leadership in Baghdad, even as JAM
losses in Basra provoked heavy fighting in Baghdad’s Sadr City.
It’s hard to assess the lasting impact of Charge of the Knights
because Basra largely drops out of most secondary source literature as
Western analysts turn their attention to the political drama of American
drawdown. It strains credibility to think that the feisty mélange of militias
and mafias that defied the rule of law in the south for years suddenly
became accommodated to Baghdad governance after a single security
crackdown. More likely, the same corrupt and feudal practices have reemerged, but there are no longer Western troops there to observe them,
nor Iranian proxies there to attack the observers.

D. Decapitation: An Alternative Explanation of COIN
Success That Is Difficult to Assess
The adoption of the FM 3-24 version of COIN by the majority of
forces was the public face of U.S. military learning in Iraq;86 however,
during the same time period but in the shadows, U.S. SOF led by Lt.
General Stanley McChrystal, commander of Joint Special Operations
Command (JSOC), developed an impressive counter-network operations
capability.87 SOF controlled the majority of unmanned aerial
86
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reconnaissance in Iraq, which, combined with growing Iraqi use of cellular
phones, provided a panoptic 24/7 surveillance network they called “the
unblinking eye.”88 Intelligence fed into a central Joint Operations Center
(JOC) staffed with analysts from the major national agencies (CIA, NSA,
NGA, etc.) who analyzed the “pattern of life” of insurgent leaders in
collaboration with others back in the U.S. and throughout Iraq.89
McChrystal’s “industrial counterterrorism” machine conducted multiple
intelligence-driven raids every night, which over the course of six years
killed or captured 15,000 insurgents.90
General Petraeus stated that “JSOC played a hugely significant
role” in Iraq by killing or capturing many “high-value targets.” He further
stressed the organizational dimension of this achievement by noting that
“the real breakthrough has been in the fusion of all this [intelligence] ...
and in the coordination and cooperation of all elements.”91 In describing
this “vital, untold chapter of the history of a global conflict,” McChrystal
observed that “[o]ver time, it became increasingly clear—often from
intercepted communications or the accounts of insurgents we had
captured—that our enemy was a constellation of fighters organized not by
rank but on the basis of relationships and acquaintances, reputation and
fame.” He adopted the now-famous slogan “It takes a network to fight a
Congress, “THE KILLING OF OSAMA BIN LADEN,” Congressional Record Volume
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network” to stress collaboration among working analysts and SOF in order
to respond to fleeting intelligence triggers.92
The strategic effect of this frenetic activity is difficult to assess
because of its secrecy. Senior officers offer little evidence to support their
accolades for JSOC. Journalists like Bob Woodward credit SOF for severe
disruption of militant networks in both Iraq and Afghanistan but without
many details.93 A few high-profile success stories, like the 2006 killing of
al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) leader Zarqawi, have been reported in more
depth.94 Yet raids like this also raise doubts, for despite the tactically
exemplary Zarqawi operation, AQI violence continued to climb
throughout 2006, and AQI maintained its capacity for mass-murder attacks
even after 2007.95 The cyclic F3EA methodology can run after high-value
targets indefinitely, boosting performance measures with impressive tales
of commando derring-do; however, the essential underground support
structure of insurgency (the -2s) may be able to withstand this.96
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Academic studies of decapitation in other cases are ambiguous: some
institutionalized groups are adept at replacing slain leaders, while others
collapse.97
Any assessment of decapitation would have to try to tease out the
interaction with conventional forces engaged in “clear, hold, build”
operations. Perhaps the former did most of the work while the latter
provided an elaborate cover. Perhaps SOF task forces actually depend on a
large conventional footprint to flush out intel. The counterterrorism
hammer and the development anvil could be truly synergistic.98 Or more
pessimistically, secretive and hyperactive SOF with an autonomous chain
of command could have been impediments to the conventional COIN
operations that were doing the real work. Relationships between the two
forces were sometimes testy, to be sure, first because conventional forces
resented SOF’s disproportionate allocation of intelligence and
reconnaissance assets, and second because violent SOF raids often caused
collateral damage in conventional areas of operation. Since Iraqis would
have a hard time believing Americans could be so disorganized, it could
undermine the difficult relationship-building work that had been done in
the community. As one special operator said, “We disappear into our
helicopters and the local unit is left to feel the pain.”99 Tension between
Obviously these studies don’t treat the JSOC “industrial counterterrorism” model,
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units with overlapping jurisdictions is inevitable, especially when one of
them eschews transparency and enjoys generous resourcing. It is difficult
to assess the degree to which these two radically different doctrines
complemented or interfered with one another.

Discussion Questions
1. How are COIN operations affected when society is controlled by
an ethnic or religious minority that suppresses the majority? If the
shift occurs too slowly, the minority might rise up, making the
occupying force seen even more illegitimate. But leaving the
minority dominant risks retaliation by the majority. What is the
most effective and efficient balance of minority/majority
dominance at each stage of transition?
2. What other factors might affect these calculations?
3. The authors state, in terms of Anbar, that “the U.S. seems to have
needed to lose before it could win.” What does this mean? Is it an
accurate analysis of how and why tribal leaders decided to stop
supporting AQI?
4. Can the U.S. cause changes in attitudes and actions, or enable
those changes? What is the difference? Why does it matter?
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V. Conclusion
We can return to our overarching question: how did the
implementation of COIN strategy and tactics, as outlined in the field
manual, match up with outcomes on the ground? Furthermore, what
alternate explanations exist for these outcomes?
After all the analysis done here, there is no simple answer to our
central question. Above all, the extent of regional variation is so great that
Iraq would be better described as multiple cases rather than one single
case. While the clear/hold/build strategy was applied in Baghdad, the
effects of sectarian homogenization may have been just as powerful. In
Anbar Province, tribal mobilization would seem to have been the most
powerful factor. In the Kurdish north, historical factors appear to have
determined the outcome. In Iraq’s south, there does not seem to be a clear
story, with the counterinsurgents throwing a variety of strategies and
tactics at a very complex societal mix. The effect of decapitation
strategies, while possibly having great effect across regions, remains
murky. While the implementation of FM 3-24 and the surge get a lot of
credit, our analysis emphasizes that correlation is not causation. An
examination of regional-level data casts doubt on any simple explanation.
Once HUMINT reports, patrol reports, interrogation reports, and other
military data stores are declassified, future researchers will have an
opportunity to better sort out the effects of these multiple strategies.
Our study does clearly emphasize several critical aspects of the
Iraq insurgency that other treatments miss or underplay. Above all, our
study identifies the critical role of the +/-2 level actors. Battalion-level
after-action reports are full of stories of partnerships with local elites. The
way counterinsurgents played local politics affected the course of the
insurgency, not only in terms of tribal mobilization but also in the actual
practice, if not the theory, of clear/hold/build. While some COIN theory
tries hard to find a silver bullet for U.S. agency in “solving” complex civil
wars, if the battle is to be played out at the +/-2 level, there is not likely to
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be one. Locals organized at the local level have their own interests. These
local organizations align one way or another for a variety of reasons. It’s a
truism that “politics” are important in COIN, but this is usually used to
talk about top-down interagency “unity of command” rather than the sort
of bottom-up competitive state building that seems to matter. Going
further, if the crucial action is occurring at the +/-2 level, then targeting is
crucial. Not only targeting of violence, but targeting of engagement and
development is crucial. Indiscriminate aid may be as counterproductive as
indiscriminate violence. To be able to target both aid and violence requires
local understanding, relationships, and intelligence.
If community-level organization is critical, counterinsurgents
should try to understand who is able to organize violent action at that
level. Who are the first actors who have the ability, network ties, and
motivation to catalyze movement from -1 to -2? If the CPA had asked
itself this question, they might not have disbanded the Iraqi Army nor
done such a complete purging of Baathists.
Our study also clearly points out how the mechanism of resentment
formation can play a critical role in the early stages of insurgency.
Invasions and occupations, especially those committed to democracy, will
almost inevitably shake up existing ethnic hierarchies and create status
reversals. Members of groups experiencing status reversals will tend to
move quickly to the -1 position on the spectrum; efforts must be made to
reassure these groups that they will not face exclusion (in the same way
that they may have formerly excluded others). Our study also specifies the
role of informational mechanisms. Counterinsurgents should try to
identify the focal points and institutions that provide information and
coordinate action. US forces may not have fully understood the
importance of the mosque in a society where other institutions had been
decimated and discredited by war and Saddam’s repressive regime.
Our study also leads to some speculation. Given the uncertainties
and high costs of other strategies, we anticipate that the robust
decapitation capability embodied in JSOC will be an enduring institutional
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legacy of this war for the U.S. military. The killing of Osama Bin Laden
further enhances its prestige. Its effectiveness, including potential
counterproductive aspects, remains hard to evaluate given its secrecy and
unknown interaction with conventional COIN. Its similarity to networkcentric warfare enhances its attractiveness for many in the US military.
However, it risks putting the tactical problems of targeting ahead of
resolution of the local and regional political issues. A potential major risk
is that SOCOM will continue to under-invest in “non-kinetic” SOF who
specialize in Foreign Internal Defense and Unconventional Warfare
missions because of the prestige and wealth accruing to the JSOC flavor of
Direct Action. These might be just the sort of low-profile, intelligenceintensive, relationship-building forces you want to engage with +/-2s,
especially during the period of waiting for interests to align.
Our framework focuses on fine-grained causal mechanisms and
how they combine in sequence to trigger and sustain insurgency. It
suggests ways in which counterinsurgency may, or may not, work to
intervene in this process. The main goal of this study, in addition to
providing an overview of the specific Iraq case, has been to provide a
fresh analytical lens for analyzing counterinsurgency.
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